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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
  Union City, New Jersey, is a unique place. Twice as dense as New York 
City and less than a mile from Manhattan, it has a front-row seat to the world’s 
most exciting goings-on and is a product of such a lengthy process of urban 
sprawl that it is well beyond being on the sidelines of urban life. It is entirely its 
own place, with a culture heavily flavored by its overwhelming Latin American 
majority and its many restaurants and businesses. 
  The sport of choice in Union City is politics, and the politician of choice 
Brian P. Stack, its mayor of eight years. Every single person in Union City has a 
tie to the man—“Brian”—he is referred to only by first name—“found me my 
apartment,” they explain, or “Brian got me this job,” or “Brian’s civic association 
filed my taxes.” Most that have government jobs called Stack directly on his 
cellular phone for help to get it (his number is common knowledge). Those that 
do not work directly under his rule sell advertisements to the mayor or receive 
social aid from his Civic Association. In his eight years of governing and ten in 
the Union City political game (he lost his first mayoral election in 1998 against 
the “Alliance” machine of now-Senator Robert Menendez), Stack—a native of 
Union City of Irish background— has somehow acquired the support of the 
roughly 82% Latin American population of the city, many of which is immigrant-
based. 
  Stack is now doing double-duty as Mayor and State Senator for his 
district. The latter title he earned in November 2007 after the previous incumbent, 
Bernard Kenny, stepped down and paved the way for one of the fiercest local 
primaries the Hudson County Democrats had ever experienced, where Stack   5 
defeated neighboring mayor Silverio “Sal” Vega of West New York in a landslide 
despite the latter being backed by the official Democratic local chapter, the 
HCDO. Stack had already become accustomed to the regular trips to Trenton 
(about a two-hour drive from Union City) through serving in the State Assembly 
for four years.  
  At a local event on August 6, 2008 in which Stack sets up a tent in a local 
street and discusses community issues with residents on a one-on-one basis, the 
locals expressed their admiration for the mayor. The event came a day after a very 
successful National Night Out Against Crime annual event that featured free food, 
government information, and entertainment and was attended by several powerful 
New Jersey politicians. Governor Jon Corzine was in attendance, as were US 
Senator Frank Lautenberg and US Congressman Albio Sires, who despite being a 
former mayor of West New York was an ally of Stack’s through the state senate 
primaries. Like all Stack events, this one also served free hot dogs. 
   “He has been the only mayor to give back to the people in this way,” said 
a man who wished to remain unidentified, but relayed that he had lived in Union 
City for 30 years since arriving from Cuba. “And he is a gringo!” the man 
continued, a Latin American colloquialism for American Caucasians. “When one 
of our race was in office, all he did was steal, and the gringo comes in and keeps 
our city running.” Stack had been elected in a 2000 recall election prompted by 
the alleged corruption of previous mayor Rudy Garcia, a member of the Cuban 
exile community. It is worthy of note that Union City is no stranger to Latino 
mayors, being the natural stomping grounds of US Senator Bob Menendez who   6 
had served as mayor in the 1980s. For Stack, the Cuban community had been the 
most difficult constituency to hold on to, since many in the community had 
formerly worked with Garcia, against whom Stack had run and lost by a narrow 
margin in 1998. Union City is home to the largest number of Cuban Americans in 
the nation, excepting, of course, Miami, Florida, making the population an 
important chunk of the constituency. But today, eight years after taking office and 
one after defeating a local Cuban politician in a state senate race, the Cuban 
Union City residents had finally started to come around. Another couple who had 
come to the “Bringing the Government to the People Event,” as Stack’s mail 
invites had labeled it, echoed the same positive remarks of their compatriot who 
laid such emphasis on Stack’s Irish background.  The Hernandez’ had come from 
Cuba in the 1970s, preceding the Mariel boatlift but succeeding the first wave of 
wealthy Cuban landowners to escape. They had lived in Union City—on the 
quaint Cottage Place in between major roads Kennedy Blvd. and Bergenline Ave., 
to be precise—the entire time. They sent their three sons to Union Hill High 
School, a relic of the days when Union City had not yet been fused from the 
remains of West Hoboken and Union Hill. Manuel Hernandez, the head of the 
family, had been a banker all his life and saved enough money to buy two houses 
on Cottage Place. Lifelong Republicans, as octogenarians they embraced the 
initiatives of their liberal mayor. “We have his cell phone number in our phone 
book, just like everyone else in Union City,” Manuel explained in Spanish. 
“When one of our houses burned down a few years ago, we were devastated, but 
Brian was there with us the whole time. It was 3 AM and we couldn’t sleep, and   7 
Brian was there watching the firefighters work, and helped us rebuild and get 
back on our feet. We are very thankful to him because he cares about this city and 
about us more than any other mayor we have seen here. When I hear the rumors 
about him stealing—they have all stolen, but Brian builds here and gives back. 
And,” the charismatic elderly man ends with a now-familiar phrase, “he’s a 
gringo. Who would’ve thought?” 
  The ethnic rift between Stack and his constituency certainly adds another 
layer of complexity to the argument that such populism is native to Latin 
America. After all, in many ways Stack is more of a coelacanth of late 19
th/early 
20
th century Irish politics. Something about the free turkeys for Thanksgiving and 
hot dogs for the 4
th of July screams the best of Tammany Hall. But most 
interesting about the Brian Stack case is that he can be so connected to his city’s 
residents while spending at least half of the week legislating in Trenton, a two-
hour drive away. It turns out that Stack is not alone in his ability to government 
multiple constituencies, and his attitude towards his people and the manner in 
which he handles the mayorship reflect in part a subculture of New Jersey politics 
that few scholars have ventured to study: the phenomenon of multiple-office 
holding. 
  The case of Union City will be a key example in helping to explain the 
behaviors of New Jersey voters and the people they elect to serve. It is one of an 
assortment of towns and cities across the state that can choose with which title 
they address their mayor, whether they are state legislator, freeholder, or other 
types of municipal leaders. Before beginning the research for this study, it was   8 
abundantly clear that this method of governing was not precisely something one 
would be able to call commonplace across the nation. In fact, a little more digging 
suggests that very few places in America allow for multiple-office holding, and of 
the few that do it is never as prevalent as it is in New Jersey. The 2008 numbers, 
for example, demonstrate that the New Jersey Legislature had 22 multiple-office 
holders in 2007.  
  For decades, New Jersey politicians have viewed multiple-office holding 
as an integral part of the urban power structure. To rise up in the totem pole, one 
must collect public office jobs until finding a comfortable resting place of power. 
While not particularly common in the less populated areas of the state, urban 
centers like the aforementioned Hudson County, Newark, and Camden have a 
tradition of sending their leaders off to Trenton without making them relinquish 
their jobs at home. And yet it was these very state legislators that passed a ban on 
the practice into law in February 2008. Supported by senator-turned-governor Jon 
Corzine, the ban passed with the support of political leaders like Stack and Sacco. 
On paper and in the pages of the New York Times it read like a rare and barely 
believable victory for political morality in what longtime NJ political journalists 
Bob Ingle and Sandy McClure call “The Soprano State”. If it sounded barely 
believable, it is probably because in practice it was not. A grandfather clause in 
the law keeps those currently in two positions of power safe from the wrath of the 
law. 
  This study intends answer several questions regarding the phenomenon of 
multiple-office holding and its sudden “extinction” in New Jersey. Most of the   9 
issues discussed in this study are divided into two categories: why multiple-office 
holding exists at all and its history within the state, and the specifics regarding the 
ban itself. On a micro level, it aspires to investigate why late 2007/early 2008 was 
an opportune time for such a law and where this grandfather clause arose from 
and why. Although the tradition has existed previously in less populated areas of 
New Jersey, especially in the 1940s, at some point (peaking in the 1990s) dual-
office holding became an essential component in the structure of an urban 
political machine. On a macro level, this study seeks to explain the place of such a 
practice in the creation and maintenance of the traditional urban political machine, 
a structure with a lush history in New Jersey that is still alive and kicking today. It 
attempts to begin a dialogue with existing literature on urban politics centered 
around the practice of dual-office holding. I have decided to tackle both issues 
through two different lenses of understanding: time and place.  
  In Part I of my study, I approach the history of multiple-office holding and 
its ban through time. When and how did this practice take hold, and what was so 
distinct about the year 2007 that it would lead to the legislature’s opinion on the 
matter changing so dramatically? I propose that the practice has been established 
within the state for nearly a century, but it was only when New Jersey’s 
metropolitan areas began to grow significantly thanks to immigration that we can 
see the grand expansion of the practice across the state. The ban in 2007 was a 
product both of this growth (it created a backlash from legislators that were not 
deeply entrenched in places where this practice was acceptable) and of the 
aftermath of the James McGreevey Administration’s complete implosion.   10 
McGreevey, a multiple-office holder himself, had many allies in the same dual-
office holding boat as he in the legislature, but with the corruption allegations and 
the Golan Cipel scandal that took him down, he gave his successor, Jon Corzine, 
the opportunity to purge (or at the very least contain) McGreevey’s allies, who 
were not yet loyal to Corzine since they had just watched the latter expel their 
leader from the highest office in the state. 
  Part II of my study proposes that investigating merely the temporal aspects 
of multiple-office holding in New Jersey creates a false impression that politics 
within the state is homogenized enough to do so. Nothing could be further from 
the truth. Using the data collected from the State Archives in Trenton on state 
legislators and their other jobs, I plotted their appearances in the state across a 
map of New Jersey to discover whether there was an even distribution of 
multiple-office holders across the state. That the practice has existed for decades 
is not specific enough information, although we do know that immigration had 
much to do with the expansion of multiple-office holding. I will argue in Part II of 
my thesis that multiple-office holding exists almost exclusively (or at least as part 
of the accepted culture) in urban areas, urban defined by population density, 
number of foreign-born residents, and number of individuals under the poverty 
line. Using these three variables, we can see that places like Hudson, Essex, and 
Passaic Counties are more vulnerable to the approach of a multiple-office holder 
than less populous, more homogenous places like Cape May or Warren Counties. 
  Given then what we know about multiple-office holding—that it is well 
established in urban centers across the state for years and the ban was in part   11 
influenced by Corzine/McGreevey turf warfare—we can then evaluate what the 
fragmentation of political culture in New Jersey means for the state of things 
within the legislature in 2007. The second half of Part II discusses the issues 
facing multiple-office holders in 2007 and the political climate in which the ban 
was passed. Specifically, it turns to the case study of the 2007 State Senate 
elections in District 33, where two mayors fought an intense campaign against 
each other for the seat. Here also we examine the way other multiple-office 
holders within the legislature felt about the matter, what positions they were in at 
the time, and how they voted. It turns out that 2007 was an especially good time 
to pass a multiple-office holding ban because the number of politicians practicing 
this skyrocketed and, in multiple-office holding enclaves, they were particularly 
powerful and vicious towards each other, enough to make for a good propaganda 
campaign against the practice itself. 
Academia and the Practice of Multiple-Office Holding Over Time 
  New Jersey, to many individuals in the rest of the nation, is an 
anachronistic time capsule stuffed to the brim with America’s greatest national 
questionable behavior. It serves as a dumping ground for those from other states 
to leave their least attractive memories behind: Bon Jovi, women with platinum 
bleached teased hair, and the long-discarded political ethics of Huey Long and 
Boss Tweed. While the state has rivals in Illinois and Rhode Island for colorfully 
criminal political characters, its singularly machine-based political structure 
stands alone in the nation. It is precisely the uniqueness of this system epitomized 
by its rigidity and extended historical tradition that this study seeks to expand on.    12 
  Political scientists establish their careers on patterns. They strive to find 
places, people, events and organizations that superficially have nothing in 
common but function on some level in a similar way. This does not bode well for 
the political scientist studying New Jersey, and most certainly not for one 
attempting to comprehend the whys and hows of multiple-office holding, a 
practice legally banned in most states. For the year 2009, the organized political 
machines of New Jersey stand in a class all their own. Thus, this study will be 
applying a great amount of literature and political science studies from elsewhere 
in America’s political timeline. 
I intend here to outline the major bodies of political science literature that 
will be contributing to my study, as well as major works that have influenced the 
piece. As the acquisition of multiple offices serves to limit the number of people 
with public service positions to the benefit of political machine leaders that find 
smaller numbers of individuals easier to manipulate, the literature on political 
machines, especially those in the New York/New Jersey area, is key to this study 
and will be discussed in depth here. There will also be a brief skim of the 
literature on multiple-office holding, but this literature is extremely rare and often 
obsolete.
1 After outlining the broader reaches of my study I propose to narrow the 
study back down to New Jersey and discuss the history of the state in political 
science. I would like to propose that literature regarding new waves of immigrants 
to New Jersey in the 1970s and 1980s invalidates claims by earlier literature that 
                                                 
1 For example, one of the most extensive studies on multiple-office holding 
heavily quotes Montesquieu as a main figure in the debate on the subject (Conklin 
1945, 333)).   13 
the rise of Irish and Italian immigrants after several generations into the higher 
classes left a patronage void in the cities. 
What is an Urban Political Machine? 
  Those most closely in the know about the way political machines work in 
New Jersey are not scholars, but journalists who have spent their lifetimes 
denouncing the corruption inherent in the machines. They have narrowly tailored 
their definition of a machine, and it deviates little from the definition of an urban 
political machine scholars use to study Tammany Hall et al. “In New Jersey,” 
write Gannett NJ journalists Bob Ingle and Sandy McClure, “government is not 
about taking care of what people can’t do for themselves. It’s about jobs” (Ingle 
2007, 4). They continue, expanding on how bosses employ their control of jobs to 
build a system of clientelism where they trade votes for jobs (Ingle 2007, 4-7). 
Bosses are a series of political leaders who may or may not hold public office but 
control the states money: the funding needed to run campaigns (Ingle 72). 
According to Asbury Park Press investigations editor Paul D’Ambrosio, “a 
candidate anointed by a boss is then blessed with an almost bottomless pit of 
campaign cash. Candidates who displease a boss are denied the campaign money 
needed to buy expensive media ads or mail out glossy fliers” (D’Ambrosio 2004). 
  Most scholars vary in their definition of an old (circa 1900) political 
machine in nuanced ways, and the fact that New Jersey has not deviated much in 
its machine structures from those studied a century ago allows scholars to 
continue to employ older literature in the definition of this. Additionally, those 
that study the closest species of machine to that existing today—the urban   14 
American political machine of the turn of the century— have a pretty narrow 
view of what constitutes a machine. Steven Erie, whose book Rainbow’s End is 
the premier piece on the construction of the urban political machine, defines the 
machine almost exclusively around the creation of jobs. “The party machine,” he 
explains, organized the electorate in order to control the tangible benefits of 
public office— patronage, services, contracts, and franchises.” Rather than use 
any ideology or political appeal to garner votes, the machine offers these benefits 
and indebts the constituency into loyalty (Erie 1990, 2).  
  Others prefer to define the machine in terms of pure power, not 
necessarily job creating ability. David Mayhew, for example, whose study 
Placing Parties in American Politics is a state-by-state survey of party 
organization in America, prefers to define the machine by control of public 
service positions. He makes a distinction between machines and “traditional party 
organizations” by limiting the scope of machines to cities and counties. 
Traditional Party Organizations, or TPOs, are basically what Erie defines as 
machines, but with a broader range of influence and a much more established 
historical precedent behind them. In most ways, machines on a local level are 
TPOs, yet not all TPOs (due to the extent of their influence) are machines 
(Mayhew 1986, 19-21). 
  Fred Greenstein, in his study of the “Old-Style Political Machine,” splits 
the definition of the machine into four parts, three of which apply completely to 
our situation today, and the fourth highlighting the major difference between the 
machines of yore and those of today. He explains that there needs to be a   15 
disciplined party hierarchy under one leader or small group that effectively 
controls nomination to public office and maintains a loyal constituency through 
material rewards (Greenstein 1964, 3). This is quite consistent with Erie’s 
definition, although he enhances it by expanding rewards to “nonideological 
psychic rewards” (camaraderie, ethnic recognition, etc), and specifies that party 
bosses needn’t hold public office at all, and that most do not. Thomas Guterbock 
agrees in his body of work, adding to this definition that patronage is a cyclical 
activity, and that machines must win elections to be able to dispense benefits just 
as much as it needs to distribute perks in order to win elections (Guterbock 1980, 
4).  
  Despite the radical shift from needing no jobs at all to become a boss to 
engaging in as many as four at a time—one that will be discussed later—this 
adheres quite clearly to the definitions given by the group of New Jersey 
journalists today. The literature quite unanimously agrees with Greenstein and 
Erie, and, since this study is remaining within the confines of New Jersey 
legislative government, with Mayhew’s as well, regarding this definition. Other 
sources of note that define machines similarly include studies by M. Craig Brown 
and Charles Halaby, John C. Scott, and Clarence Stone, among others (see 
bibliography). 
The Elusive Modern Machine 
  The consensus among political scientists seems to be that the structure of 
the political machine as defined above is a fossil of American political history, an 
amusing ethnic phenomenon in American cities between the late 1800s and up   16 
until the assimilation of white ethnics into mainstream American culture, which is 
a date that ranges in estimations from post-WWII to the 1980s, but in most cases 
is certainly far behind us. Erie’s study of the Irish political machines built upon 
the heavy flow of Irish immigrants into America in the late 19
th/early 20
th century 
spans the years 1840 to 1985, shortly before the work was published. However, in 
it Erie suggests that the machines, once having passed their embryonic stage 
(when immigrants are naturalized and bought with patronage) and their 
consolidation stage (where the machines begin pushing their leaders to win 
elections), found trouble in rising from their own ashes after being severely 
weakened by the New Deal. The New Deal strengthened labor coalitions and 
many who benefited from it who were once dependent on patronage moved 
upward in the classes and were no longer impressed by this power. The argument 
continues that the budget cuts on social programs by Republicans post-New Deal 
(especially in the Reagan era) made it nearly impossible for machines to offer 
anything in exchange for votes (Erie 1990, 16-17).  
  Other scholars give the political machine a slightly longer lifespan—
Mayhew studying “party organization” in the 1960s in his 1986 book and finding 
the need to employ the term “machine” when discussing New Jersey, Illinois, and 
a small number of similar states. Guterbock, writing in 1980, also allows that the 
New Deal did not kill political machines, but follows this trend with reservation 
for the future, despite noting Chicago as “a marked deviation” from other cities 
(13). He quotes colleague Samuel Eldersveld: “On the way out, presumably, is the 
‘old-style’ local politics, with its discipline, personal loyalty, spoils system,   17 
welfare services, the deliverable vote, and continuous year-round attention to 
precinct affairs” (12). 
  It is possible to forgive the aforementioned scholars’ shortsightedness 
because of the date in which they wrote, when the Reagan cutbacks were at their 
most present. Yet even political scientists writing from a much more removed 
chronological perspective seem to agree. In his review of urban political machines 
and their impact on American politics, Clarence Stone engages in discussion on 
the nostalgia for the “good old days,” citing the political machine nostalgia phase 
as beginning around 1956 with the publication of Edwin O’Connor’s The Last 
Hurrah (Stone 1996, 446). Stephen Weissman attempted to study one of the most 
important parts of the state in this study—Jersey City, NJ—in the 1970s, 
searching for a post-machine political structure where white ethnics had 
socioeconomically outgrown the machines. Without these impoverished, not-yet-
integrated masses of white immigrants, the machine, Weissman argues, has little 
space for development (Weissman 1976, 182-183).  
  It has probably become clear from the specific studies mentioned here just 
how quick political scientists were in burying the phenomenon. In fact, the most 
prominent studies discussing urban politics beyond the time of their prime are 
decades old, with most current political science research focusing elsewhere in the 
urban political sector. Some scholars have focused on explicitly limiting the 
power of municipal government. Paul Peterson’s City Limits, for example, is a 
study dedicated to proving that cities are nothing without federal support; that is 
to say, the study of a city without taking into consideration national contexts   18 
presupposes that cities have an autonomy that does not exist. Although Peterson 
laments in 1981 that “urban political analysis has been removed once again to the 
periphery of political science discipline” (ix), he later claims that the goings-on in 
most cities are out of the control of city leaders and strongly influenced by higher 
powers (Peterson 1981, 5). If this is true, then studying what happens on the 
grounds of cities appears obsolete, since there is nothing happening on the lower 
levels that is also not happening above. 
  Peterson is an exception to the more recent trend of urban politics. Rather 
than looking at the actual political issues that resonate within a city, scholars have 
focused their research more on the so-called “melting pot” of the American urban 
landscape, as well as mostly on ethnic and class warfare in the urban sector. Titles 
such as Racial Politics in American Cities, Politics in Black and White, The 
Politics of Minority Coalitions, and Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Urban 
America focus considerably more on interactions between classes and racial 
minorities in the urban sector horizontally rather than examining much of what 
happens within the walls of City Hall. There is much sociological value in 
studying the interactions among various groups and their place in the social 
structure, as well as the relative strengths and weaknesses of social organizations 
among minority groups in the cities. However, to neglect to pay as much attention 
to the functioning of government at such a close local level leaves a gaping 
loophole in the evaluation of the efficiency of this government and the power of 
individual constituents to govern themselves. There is much more to modern 
urban politics than the fact that many individuals in cities happen to be minorities.   19 
New Immigration and the Fully Expanded City 
  The New Jersey of the late 20
th and early 21
st century, ironically the same 
era that spawned the ban on multiple office-holding, defies the trend that political 
scientists have been following of a change in direction from the politics of 
“bosses” to the politics of “leaders” (Guterbock 1980, 12). Here we find political 
structures that fit all the above criteria for a machine: corruption, clientelism, quid 
pro quo politics, and, yes, the emergence of political bosses. It is as if the small, 
oddly shaped enclave is a political coelacanth existing much to the dismay of 
those political scientists that believed it was finally time to close the chapter on 
this specific structure. Despite the irrelevance of most studies on ethnic political 
coalitions and the struggles among minorities for acceptance and government 
benefits, continuation of machine politics has much to do with the introduction of 
new ethnic minorities into the cities. Erie, Weissman, Guterbock and others fail to 
recognize that the depleted population of white ethnics did not mean the complete 
death of the machine. The two points that they discuss as having nailed the coffin 
for the machines—the integration of white ethnics into the mainstream (mostly 
Weissman) and the elimination of further city expansion by the limits of urban 
sprawl—a point made by Erie to be discussed very soon—have been replaced by 
very steady substitutes. These scholars failed to anticipate in their studies two 
very important social events particularly of significance to New Jersey residents 
that occurred in the past three decades. 
  Looking historically at the way political machines have organized 
themselves in New Jersey over time, an argument could be made that it is not a   20 
complete expansion of these machines that has occurred but, rather, the change in 
ethnic composition has benefited some machines to the expense of others. Citing 
a study by John Blydenburgh, David Mayhew points out that, despite (as we will 
see later) inter-party competition not being a significant factor in machine 
building or the development of multiple-office holding, machines are divided by 
party as much as by region. Blydenburgh divided the New Jersey machines into 
twelve subdivisions, six Democrat and six Republican, in the 1960s
2. For the most 
part, these divisions by party still remain (Bergen County Democrats being one of 
the major new characters since the study) (Mayhew 1986, 49). However, the 
ethnic and socioeconomic divides that once existed in the time of this study have 
dramatically changed. To keep consistent the argument put forth by Weissman et 
al that poor white ethnics are necessary for the development of a machine one 
must ignore that the dynamics of New Jersey, thanks to a great influx of 
immigrants that, while otherwise mostly the same as white ethnics politically, 
come from areas such as Latin America and are equally susceptible to use by 
patronage-brandish elements. These populations have taken over many of the 
counties that were once great political centers and fed the political machines 
there, also to the demise of a few of them, mostly on the Republican side. And, as 
we will see in future chapters, the influx of new immigrants into these pre-
established machines has changed the dynamics of many of the state’s most 
popular areas for multiple-office holding. 
                                                 
2 Republican: Atlantic County, Bergen County, Cape May County, Burlington 
County, Somerset County, and Monmouth County. Democrat: Hudson County, 
Essex County, Camden County, Mercer County, Passaic County, and Middlesex 
County. (Mayhew 48-49).   21 
  Turning to this very specific machine practice, the changing populations, 
especially those that were both increasing and redefining the culture of many 
machine-controlled areas, created a more fertile atmosphere for multiple-office 
holding. Many scholars comment that most political bosses from the golden days 
needed only one publicly elected job to maintain their power. They were mostly 
mayors or other major local figures with very long outstretching influence to the 
outside world, due to their manipulation of patronage and votes. Boss William M. 
Tweed, for example, was never a US Congressman while he was in the New York 
State Senate or the New York City Board of Advisors. Their influence was 
significantly cut short as their constituencies became wealthier; after all, since 
their main way of garnering votes was to register poor voters and given them 
social benefits and jobs, the ascent of these poor people (mostly white ethnics) 
was bad news to the bosses (Stone 1996, 448). The boss’s influence was cut short. 
The voters were not under complete control, since by the second generation they 
were America-born citizens with the opportunities of education and, eventually a 
bourgeois or even higher-class lifestyle. The bosses technically only had the 
powers vested in them by their single job, and without the support they could not 
bend this power as they were once capable of doing. The influx of immigrants 
could only feed the machine for so long, although the poorer populations who 
always demand social programs and government money to maintain afloat were 
helpful in maintaining the multiple-office holding tradition. Besides the main 
arguments laid in the following paragraphs regarding the permanence of multiple-
office holding, it appears rational for a group of lower-income individuals who   22 
construct the backbone of a machine to want their party boss to take a more 
powerful role in state politics and have more control over the distribution of 
funding to their district. 
  In the past, the fluid construction of cities made it unnecessary to bother 
with two jobs when the pool of loyal constituents began to evaporate as they rose 
in socioeconomic status. Steven Erie contends that one way in which bosses 
maintained a fluid pool of patronage recipients under their control was merely to 
expand the cities to include them. This was particularly common in what most 
political scholars consider the “golden age” of political machines. For example, 
between 1880 and 1990, the twenty largest cities in America increased their 
territory by nearly one-third. He explains, “machine politicians pursued an 
aggressive annexation program to enlarge the city’s boundaries and revenue base” 
(56). To employ expansion and absorption of neighboring immigrant towns as a 
main tool for maintaining upright a machine means that, today, in a nation where 
there is little elsewhere for cities to expand, once the supply of immigrant voters 
is depleted, there is no further feeding the machine. Returning to the New York 
example, in today’s America it would be unbelievable for the city to expand itself 
beyond its borders to, say, the New Jersey urban sector, and irrational to expand 
to the upper-class neighborhoods north of the City. Thus, the machine, if one were 
to still exist, would have no population to do business with once all of its 
immigrants and poor were naturalized and aided by the government enough to 
become middle-class, apolitical entities.   23 
  To argue that the machines survived, it is necessary to point out a 
mechanism by which they would have done so, either a method of expansion or a 
new population to engage in clientelism. Without these two items it makes perfect 
sense for the machines to have died off sometime after the New Deal, when most 
managed to pull themselves up and out of a position where a machine could offer 
them patronage jobs and government money in exchange for votes. Here I 
propose both. If politicians cannot expand the scope of their current constituency 
the way they once did through land expansion, they can just acquire a new one—
at least in pre-2008 New Jersey, where laws against multiple-office holding did 
not stand. A mayor of a small town with no real discernable suburbs or strong 
influx of immigrants, such as Mayor Leonard Connors of Surf City, NJ, could 
expand his influence from his small town of 1, 549 people (US Census 2005) to 
an entire district of 233, 745 (Rutgers NJ Databook 2008) without having to do 
much legal work—just a legislative campaign. Of course, multiple-office holding 
becomes a much more efficient expansion technique in the urban sectors because 
of the class status of many residents and the population density—the greatest in 
the nation. For example, the mayor of Union City, NJ, Mayor Brian P. Stack, has 
a constituency of 62, 715 individuals under his 1.2 square-mile terrain (Us Census 
2007). By also assuming the state senator position in 2008, Stack expands his 
influence to 206, 676 individuals throughout the district. Yet more importantly, of 
these individuals under the 33
rd district’s control, 46.4% are foreign born as of the 
year 2000, and 57.5% are of Latin American descent. (Rutgers 2008). Not only 
does having two offices then increase the scope of influence by sheer numbers,   24 
but now leaders have a way of finding minority populations to manipulate with 
voter registration, patronage, and social benefit support to feed the machine. This 
is aided by the many years of careful gerrymandering that has lead to some of the 
strangest-looking congressional districts in America.
3 
  The Latin American population, especially in Hudson County, has been 
the crux of the continuation of machine politics. Replacing the white ethnics in 
the 1970s in places like Bayonne, Jersey City, Elizabeth, and Camden were flocks 
of Latin Americans, particularly Cuban-Americans fleeing from the communist 
Cuban Revolution. Already fairly adjusted to clientele politics, these immigrants 
were greeted by politicians descending from the white ethnics once controlled by 
tradition machines, who were willing to aid them with social benefits and, after 
the necessary allotted time, suffrage, in exchange for votes. Another notable 
population with no voter registration issues trickling into New Jersey at the time 
was the New York-based Puerto Ricans searching for a better life out of Upper 
Manhattan. Their presence in these areas create urban “safe spaces” for Spanish-
speaking populations who were fleeing from more white-populated, racially 
uncomfortable areas of the nation. To this day, New Jersey is shadowed only by 
the much larger California and New York in percentage of immigrant population 
(FAIR 2008). What this means for party identification, a topic only tangentially 
related to multiple-office holding since, as this study will later explain, many 
times multiple-office holding functions to unite legislators much the same way 
                                                 
3 For example, on a national level, District 13 now represented by Congressman 
Albio Sires of West New York, NJ, is divided into two pieces that span Hudson 
County but somewhat curiously include parts of Union and Middlesex Counties.   25 
party ID does, is that in many areas that were once great machine centers for one 
party, the identification has shifted. With the exception of the Cuban-American 
lobby, most Latin American voters identify with the Democratic Party 
traditionally. Their arrival in centers that were once Republican in the 1960s like 
Monmouth and Atlantic Counties have breathed air into the multiple-office 
holding tradition, but have also strengthened the Democratic Party there, as will 
be proven in further chapters. Bergen County has also been the victim of urban 
sprawl and beginning to resemble neighbors Hudson and Essex more than 
Republican strongholds like Morris County, and is one of the more active 
multiple-office holding areas in the state. What’s more, further study has 
demonstrated that areas like Burlington County that continue to be Republican 
where the new immigrants have not prominently settled have begun to lag behind 
other Democratic areas in public servants with multiple offices (see Chapter 4). 
  Because the literature has currently been insufficient in the study of 
multiple-office holding as an individual tool for the construction of a political 
machine, much of my work will have to occur in the field. I will prove with data 
extracted from State Legislative biographical sketches in the Legislative Manual 
of the State of New Jersey that multiple office holding was on the rise closely 
before the ban was passed (along with immigration). As journalists Ingle and 
McClure are wont to say, nothing happens in New Jersey unless it benefits a 
higher power politically or economically. I will explore the precise place of this 
practice in the culture and development of a political machine with interviews   26 
with both recipients of patronage, longtime witnesses to the development of 
machines, and machine bosses (or developing bosses) themselves. 
Filling Up the Near-Empty New Jersey Academic Pool  
  Previous examination of the academic literature related to local politics in 
areas like New Jersey reveals a comfortably wide niche for the study of multiple-
office holding. Even those studying localized municipal or even state politics will 
find that they have a significantly more shallow pool of forebears on which to 
base their literature than their counterparts interested in larger national trends. 
Moreover, studies examining New Jersey’s very particular flavor of intense local 
politics and corruption are often the creation of individuals deeply embedded in 
the system, and as such are often descriptive journalistic endeavors that would be 
frowned upon by the more “sophisticated” elements of the academic community. 
For the researcher, this translated into a deeper exploration of the world from 
which these activities arise: the culture that allows levels of multiple-office 
holding that other states would deem obscene, then tears down the practice on 
paper while even more politicians slip through the loopholes and into the 
legislature.  
  A significant slice will attempt to comprehend multiple-office holding in 
New Jersey over time and across its relatively small yet diverse geography. In 
order to develop an argument regarding the positive and negative effects of 
banning “double-dipping” in the state, as well as the why and how behind how 
this bill passed in a legislature previously so warm to double-dippers, one must 
understand just how deeply embedded the practice is in the state, and who   27 
benefited historically. The second large chunk of research involves studying the 
practice on a micro-level, although also historically. Speaking to those individuals 
directly engrossed in the practice and those that were there to watch and vote on 
the bill that removed multiple-office holding from the New Jersey Legislature 
enhances the statistics taken from public and private records with personal 
experiences and opinions from those that have actually dedicated a significant 
amount of their lives to politics, rather than those that merely study it. Once the 
blanket influence of the practice has been examined, the specifics can take shape 
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PART I: A Historical Survey of Multiple-Office Holding in New Jersey 
CHAPTER 2: The Evolution of Multiple-Office Holding in History 
Holding a state office allows for enough power in a larger territory and 
more access to state funds, making the numbers big enough to study as opposed 
to, say, an office that only expands the constituency to a countywide level. The 
expansion of power makes the discrepancies between single-office and multiple-
office politicians more distinct than they would on a local level. As such, they 
lead to temptation for single-office holders that are not afraid to bite off more than 
they can chew, and equally inspire the ire of powerful figures who have denied 
themselves the double salary and pension but maintained significant influence, 
such as Governor Jon Corzine. As important a character as Corzine is, however, 
to fully understand multiple-office holding one must study the main players in the 
game before the chaperone that shuts it down. While finding every multiple-office 
holder in every level of government within New Jersey would be the most 
thorough investigation of the matter, the organization and availability of archives 
limits the study. There is a record of individuals who have served in the New 
Jersey legislature spanning time from the present back until about 1870; however, 
there is no uniform record of individuals that have served in other local offices, 
such as Freeholder
4 or City Council positions. Due to the lack of cohesive 
                                                 
4 The Board of Chosen Freeholders is a government body unique to the state of 
New Jersey that functions on the county level. It is the legislative body of each of 
the 21 counties of the state. The term “Freeholder” is unique in American politics, 
as per the New Jersey Constitution of 1776, and stems from the fact that county 
legislatures were required to have a “clear estate”, or a “freehold”. In modern 
New Jersey, each county has a legislature with numbers of their choosing 
depending on respective populations, and in many the Board merely passes any 
legislation that goes through the County Executive (“What is a Freeholder?” 
2007).   29 
information on smaller, more numerous bodies in the state, it appeared more 
efficient to leave the study of multiple-office holding on a municipal level to a 
researcher dedicated exclusively to the subject. 
  The pertinent information on multiple-office holding at the legislative 
level in this work was collected from a series of government almanacs called the 
Manual of the Legislature of New Jersey. According to the online records and 
glossary of the New Jersey Legislature itself, the books are also commonly 
referred to as Fitzgerald’s Red Book or Fitzgerald’s Legislative Manual (“NJ 
Legislature Glossary” 2008). They are named after Thomas F. Fitzgerald, a 
fixture in the Trenton literature and journalism scene in the 19
th century who 
dedicated his career outside of local media to editing the manuals for forty years, 
as well as the Trenton City Directory (Cleary 1929). They are private 
publications, but the only ones of their kind in New Jersey, and the most 
thoroughly informed almanacs of the state government. Miscellaneous volumes of 
them are kept in New Jersey university libraries as well, but it is rare to find a 
complete collection of them. The most complete collections are to be found in two 
places: the New Jersey State Archives and the New Jersey State Library, both in 
Trenton.  
  Among the highlights of the books are information on the executive and 
judicial branches, thorough biographies of the governor at the time (except in 
cases when there is an interim governor), and bills passed in the year of 
publication, they contain biographical sketches of all the legislators in a given 
year, separated by chamber. These sketches often include a series of information   30 
relative to the legislative and private lives of the senators and assemblymen, 
beginning often with birthdates and places and family members, and also 
highlighting specific bills or issues that are of particular interest to the legislator. 
Almost always one can find a paragraph on the previous experience of the 
legislator in public office, and here is where one would find such information as 
whether the legislator has held a job simultaneously with the state-wide job he or 
she currently holds. Also of note in the biographical sketches are the familial 
relationships between some of the legislators, noting how some seats are 
sometimes “passed down” through generations.  
  To first find and collect the books required a trip to the state’s capital, 
Trenton, and permission to enter the New Jersey State Archives
5. This study will 
concern itself only with the past 70 years of multiple-office holding in the state, 
from 1934-2008
6.  
                                                 
5 Trenton is a city so heavily overcome with its own reputation as a crime-ridden 
wasteland that its very obvious attempts at aestheticizing its deplorable condition 
give the appearance of the caked-on make up on a former model desperate to 
retain her beauty. Every street is lined with government buildings that recall a 
time of significant grandeur in its history that clearly passed long ago, much in the 
way that its coastal cousin, Atlantic City, is littered with historically significant 
landmarks overridden by the city’s contemporary atmosphere. Trenton, however, 
has no ocean or casinos; the only escape from the claustrophobic peach-colored 
landscape is across the murky Delaware River. 
6 The methodology behind compiling this information was much more 
meticulously applied to the last 20 years of legislative history, as in order to 
explain the ban it was significantly more necessary to fact-check and be near 
100% certain of the accuracy of the number of multiple-office holders in the years 
preceding the ban, while all the years previous are merely necessary to establish a 
precedent for this kind of behavior in state history. Thus, errors are more likely to 
occur within the years before 1988, although attempts were made to limit the 
number of discrepancies in as many years as possible.   31 
  Once having acquired the necessary records, I began to compile a list of 
multiple-office holders using the information in the biographical sketches. I 
narrowed the definition of a second office to any high office in the executive 
department of a city or county and/or any elected office. For the most part, this 
definition includes but is not limited to mayoral positions, freeholder/county 
positions, and no appointed jobs. It does not include elected party offices, 
however, which some may argue should be included in the study of multiple-
office holding because of the power which they give when coupled with a 
geographically favorable area to the given party.
7  
  The biographies of some legislators that were to be found on their 
websites or in alternative press sources did not match the ones in the legislative 
manuals. The most prominent example of this is former Union City mayor Raul 
“Rudy” Garcia, who also served as a state assemblyman for the 33
rd District while 
he was in office. A dark cloud of suspicion regarding the mayor's administration 
of municipal finances and rumors related to a domestic abuse probe (according to 
members of the Brian Stack Change ’98 campaign team) hung quite low over 
Garcia’s tenure, climaxing in a proposed recall election against him led by current 
mayor Brian P. Stack. Mayor Garcia resigned shortly after being assaulted by the 
one-two punch of the attempted recall vote and a state investigation on his 
activities (Strunsky 2000). Possibly because of the turmoil surrounding him, 
                                                 
7 While the objective of this study is to reach a conclusion on elected offices and 
the power they give to politicians to construct machines, the topic of party 
leadership will also be addressed. Party leaders who also have business in the 
legislature will be discussed in the next section of this chapter, which discusses 
the interview process.    32 
Mayor Garcia’s biographical sketches in the Legislative Manual are distinguished 
by their lack of insight into Garcia both as a person and a politician, and do not 
include the fact that Garcia was ever mayor of Union City. The fact that the 
legislator was, indeed, simultaneously serving as mayor was verified by reports in 
the New York Times (Strunsky 2000).  
  Given the nature of the sketch, which stood out in the book for its length 
and the lack of specifics about the legislator’s life and, especially, his previous 
political experience, it became easier as one became accustomed to the typical 
biographical sketch to discover similar politicians with intentionally obscured 
pasts. Any item that was outstandingly vague when discussing a politician’s past 
record (careers like “activist” or “public figure”) or short in length without a 
legitimate reason (these being an extremely short tenure in the legislature or a 
sudden mid-year promotion of the legislator to a higher executive branch 
position) was considered suspicious and confirmed by trustworthy online sources. 
The three Internet sources most commonly useful in this process were the state-
sponsored websites of the legislators, the New York Times, and local newspaper 
sources, such as the Star Ledger or the Jersey Journal. 
Multiple-Office Holding in the NJ Legislature By the Numbers: Findings 
  Multiple-office holding in the New Jersey Legislature cannot possibly be 
considered a new development in the state, nor one particularly foreign to the 
nature of a state notorious for power struggles and corruption debacles. If 
politicians can make more money and accumulate more power by serving 
different constituencies they have little reason to refuse. On the other hand, many   33 
in the demonized position of holding more than one office, as demonstrated 
further on in this study, will point to reelection ratios, legitimate community 
improvements, and the failures of other single-office holders around them to 
justify their position. To elucidate the situation would require taking into 
consideration the evolution of multiple-office holding as a statewide phenomenon 
existing for nearly a century in the state’s history and perhaps more.   
 
  Figure 1 above shows the overall number of multiple-office holders in 
both chambers in the past 74 years. The trend, with the exception of some off 
years in which a large number of multiple-office holders retired and left open 
spots for legislators that did not hold a second office, is clearly upward. The last 
decade of legal multiple-office holding also saw the largest single-year increase in   34 
the near-century preceding it. However, before engaging with the data of the past 
decade, the numbers for the earlier years of the legislature require some study. 
  The years before 1972 experienced a gradual yet persistent attempt to 
expand the legislature to adapt to the ever-increasing population (and population 
density) of the state. The numbers demonstrate a clear but inconsistent increase 
since 1947; before this year the trend appears weaker and more persistent towards 
the positive direction. 1947 was a transformative year for the state and saw the 
implementation of a new constitution that expanded executive power within the 
state to additional vetoes and placed under the executive office a new variety of 
organizations that were previously independent of the executive branch of the 
state or simply private (NJ Legislative Manual 1947). With this expansion came 
longer terms for the legislators: four years for senators and two for general 
assemblymen. The impact of this legislation creates four-to-six year cycles of 
increase and decreases in the number of multiple-office holders most visible in the 
divide between 1955 and 1959. In 1955 one can assess a visible decrease in the 
number of multiple-office holders unlike that before. This is due to an outgoing 
class of both senators (two terms in) and assemblymen (two to four terms in) 
finding replacements from career politicians with no other occupations. It takes 
another four years for an incoming class of multiple-office holders to take 
advantage of the open seats and, in some cases, for those members of the 
legislature to adopt a second job. Here the increase is natural and not particularly 
affected by any artificial factors outside of elections causing individuals to   35 
become legislators who already held another position and establishing strong 
incumbents in the process.  
  The increase in 1966 is, on the contrary, not by the nature of the vote of 
the people. By this time, the population and population density of the state was 
growing at an increasingly rapid rate, and the first wave of immigrants from Latin 
America, mostly upper-class Cuban exiles fleeing the Castro regime, were settling 
in and taking their rightful place in the New Jersey constituencies. In order to 
accommodate these new immigrants, the state attempted another expansion of 
both its chambers. The Senate was expanded from 21 to 40 members and the 
General Assembly from 60 to 80, thus making the total number of new and 
potential multiple-office holders 120.
8 With this expansion, a new crop of 
multiple-office holders were elected to the legislature that have little impact on 
the percentage change, nor does this increase correlate to any significant stimulus 
for an increase in multiple-office holding.  
  As argued in the introduction, one of the greatest reasons for politicians to 
pursue a second job outside of the collection of a second pension is to increase the 
span of influence for a political machine. The most efficient fuel of political 
machines, and the simplest way for the machines to create new and easily 
controllable voters, is to tap into new immigrant populations that are more likely 
to need government support and naturalize them into the system. Immigrants have 
no initial expectations from the American political system that would decrease 
                                                 
8 All the historic information in this chapter about the New Jersey Legislature was 
attained from the history of the NJ Legislature on the official website of the 
legislative branch of the state: 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/history.asp   36 
their vulnerability against machine leaders, but do have many needs, such as the 
need for patronage jobs or money from social programs. Moreover, by this 
comparatively recent history, machines had learned their lessons from the past. 
The earliest immigrant machines in America that had capitalized on immigration 
by extending their influence to help the new Americans had neglected to continue 
the process with the new crop of immigrants several years later. Erie explains: 
“having already fashioned a minimal winning electoral coalition among the 
earlier-arriving immigrants with the sturdiest of materials—jobs and money—the 
new machines turned their backs on later immigrants.” This opened the way for 
reform politicians to “[mobilize] the newcomers and [seize] on their discontent 
with the machine’s limited rewards” (Erie 1990, 69).  
  In the 1960s, New Jersey’s population was in the process of revitalization 
through immigration, and because of the great influx of new Americans into the 
state, political machines were healthy and strong on their own. Politicians could 
expand their influence through naturalization and count on the votes of the newest 
citizens and their children. In a system where political machines have a healthy 
amount of support from immigrants and have a large pool from which to 
naturalize and strengthen, there is a significantly small tendency for politicians to 
pursue second offices. They can control a city by generating new voters within the 
city or county limits, and because of the rapid rate of increase in population 
density they are more likely to establish a good rapport with their local legislator. 
This rapport can lead to a good amount of funding for social programs and 
projects, given that the increase in naturalized citizens and their socioeconomic   37 
ascent provides evidence for the success of social programs funded by the state, 
and the growing population justifies creating new government bureaucracy. Thus 
the increases in the 1960s can be characterized as a side effect of the increase in 
total population of legislators rather than the impact of any individual factor 
within the communities that could trigger a rise in the practice. 
  Something similar can be said of the 1972 increase in multiple-office 
holding. In 1972, because of the extremely rapid rate of increase in population 
density, New Jersey finally mandated that its legislature be composed of 
representatives from special districts that were created with the intent of 
increasing the efficiency of representation and dividing the state appropriately by 
population (and also, of course, with the underhanded intent to gerrymander in a 
more efficient way). This resulted in an increase in multiple-office holders in 
general, but the rise in number is artificial because the overall number of 
legislators increased, as well.  
  The reasons for the gradual yet comparatively unimpressive increase in 
multiple-office holding in the 1970s and nearly stagnant activity in the 1980s to 
follow are manifold. In the next few pages, however, I will argue that a great 
contributor to this stagnation was the very reliable influx of immigrants that kept 
machines alive by buying their product. However, it is also worthy of note that 
during this time period, the machines or major political icons who would be 
inclined towards multiple-office holding in a future where it was necessary were 
particularly under attack from the federal government. Federal indictments in the 
1970s left the political landscape a little barren for the type of activity in this   38 
study, especially in areas where the practice tends to be most common.
9 Mayhew 
notes that in 1979, “as prosecutors closed in on Democratic party chairman Harry 
Lerner… a reform movement redesigned the structure of the county’s government 
[and] evidently cut off its patronage.” This event in Essex County, home to 
Newark and one of the largest bastions of multiple-office holding, left the 
political machine devoid of a major figure and replaced typical patronage 
methods of acquiring votes with issues, such as generic drugs and tenant rebates. 
To make political issues a priority instantly weakens any machine built upon 
patronage and naturalization (Mayhew 55). 
  The fact that, for the period spanning to 1989, the number of multiple-
office holders seems to average out at a flat rate, seems to additionally corroborate 
the fact that the increase is of an alternate origin, since if it were a legitimate 
increase by percentage of the practice, it would probably demonstrate a more 
dramatic rise than that which occurred before the switch from counties to districts. 
This fits quite well into the theory that multiple-office holding is the result of a 
machine that is cornered by lack of immigrant supporters to expand its 
constituency to new potential supporters. The 1980s, which end in a similarly low 
note for the practice as they begin comparatively (despite the increase in 
representatives and the experimentation with districts that then began), also 
demonstrate this. The 1980s is one of the most dynamic decades in terms of 
immigration of the past century. According to a study by the Workforce New 
Jersey Public Information Network, “the majority of [New Jersey’s] foreign 
                                                 
9 Places that have more or less affinity towards multiple-office holding within the 
state will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.   39 
population migrated to the state during the 1985-2000 period… the largest (22%) 
entered the United States during the 1985-1989 period”  (Wu 1). And for key 
multiple-office holding areas like Hudson, Passaic, Essex, and Union Counties, a 
decent percentage of these immigrants, as well, emigrated from Latin America. 
While most of the refugees arriving from Cuba in 1980 via the Mariel boat lift 
stayed in Miami, New Jersey was the second most popular destination, and as the 
Cuban and Puerto Rican communities already settled in New Jersey created a safe 
environment for other immigrants who had not yet learned to speak English and 
were looking for an area in which they would not have to face issues of 
discrimination or merely inconvenience at not knowing the language. These 
immigrants, while more difficult to assimilate to American culture than the 
traditional Irish immigrants the local machines had accustomed themselves to 
over the late 19th and beginning of the 20
th Century due to the language barrier, 
eventually served just as well in developing and feeding the machines. As the 
1980s were some of the most active years in terms of immigrant activity, it would 
follow that bosses would reap the benefits of having these immigrants as 
supporters, as well as the first generation of Americans born from them 20 years 
later, and thus not have to resort to multiple-office holding. A political climate in 
which immigrants are eager to participate in patronage and power maneuvers in 
order to reap the benefits of an interactive government is one in which the 
voracious machines do not need to extend their tentacles to feed, and thus is not a 
fertile climate for multiple-office holders, as discussed previously. Moreover, 
since the overall pool of great political father figures shrunk in the late 1970s due   40 
to investigations by the federal authorities that led to the arrest of many of the 
greatest leaders of the period, the machine itself shrunk and needed less support 
all-around to survive. Political leaders had no real interest or necessity in taking 
more than one government job outside of the pensions, and even those, in many 
cases, were probably not worth the many trips to Trenton on a regular basis and 
the responsibilities of holding two elected offices. 
Magnifying Multiple-Office Holding: 1988-2008 
  Certainly the most active time in the history of multiple-office holding in 
the state legislature has been the years preceding the ban, where multiple-office 
holding appeared to be catching on across the state and the state’s attitude towards 
politicians with questionable ethical activity became more favorable than it once 
was in the late 1970s when the federal authorities cleaned up the map. Thus, in 
order to continue with this study properly and address in the next chapter the 
issues regarding the time period in which this ban was implemented, we must take 
a closer look at the past twenty years of legislative history.   41 
 
Figure 2 above shows the number of multiple-office holders in the entire state per 
year from 1988 to 2008. It was generated from Figure 1 and is not distinguishable 
from the years spanned here in Figure 1 in any way, but it does clarify many 
things about recent New Jersey history to have the opportunity to look solely at 
the last 20 years for information. Once again the definition of multiple-office 
holder is limited to those which hold an elected position in addition to the 
legislative seat, so appointed positions are not taken into consideration. No 
significant events are labeled on this chart because, after 1972, the number of 
legislators did not change in any dramatic fashion constitutionally, nor were there 
any occurrences that the researcher estimated would distort the validity of the 
fluctuations in multiple-office holders over time. 
  While on the whole a slight increase in legislators with a second public 
office has been witnessed over time, studying the past twenty years demonstrates   42 
something counterintuitive to the original hypothesis
10 of this study: within the 
past decade the number of multiple-office holders increased in number 
dramatically. Between 2001 and 2002 the number in both chambers combined 
increased from 14 to 24 double-dippers, with the number remaining steadily 
above 20 until the partial ban in 2008.
11 Explaining this growth of multiple-office 
holding population in the legislature is imperative to this study, especially the jolt 
between 2001 and 2002. In terms of the broadest changes in the demographics of 
the state that affect this issue, of course immigration is sure to be one of the top 
players behind the change.  According to the WNJPIN, the increase in foreign-
born population in New Jersey was less than across the country during this time, 
despite New Jersey’s percentage still being higher than the national average, both 
in foreign-born and in foreign stock (Wu 2008). Additionally, the individuals born 
of these foreigners who are first generation Americans are no longer disposed 
towards patronage in the favorable way they once were. The development of a 
new class of first-generation immigrant children twenty years after the 1980s 
stagnation in multiple-office holding creates an opportunity for multiple-office 
holding to appeal to constituents who are still not ready for an issues-centered 
                                                 
10 Previous to having collected this information I had supposed that the ban came 
at the tail end of a decline in number of multiple-office holders, as a decline 
would render the practice obsolete and also empty the legislature of a sufficient 
majority with an interest in continuing to allow the practice. 
11 The Star-Ledger actually found the number of dual office holders in 2007 and 
2008 to be somewhat different. They found that, using their measures, the number 
of multiple-office holders in the legislature increased from 17 to 19 between the 
two years (Schwaneberg 2008). However, this is because they did not include in 
their study positions that had the power of elected positions but were appointed, 
such as Chief Financial Officer or Police Chief. I included these positions because 
these individuals are often public figures deeply associated with the campaigns 
and, as such, as indirectly voted for.   43 
campaign but have enough money to avoid the free turkeys at Thanksgiving. 
Couple this with some significant redistricting between 2001 and 2002 and the 
climate suddenly warms up toward multiple-office holding to expand the 
constituency to more people that need jobs.  
There is another extremely important factor in this increase—the election 
of a multiple-office holder to the state’s highest executive office. James 
McGreevey, mayor of Woodbridge and state senator, was elected governor in 
2001, and with his high approval ratings came a surge of multiple-office holders 
in the state legislature. He used his coattails to get his allies in power in the 
legislature (more on relationships between multiple-office holders in Chapter 5), 
and as such for the years he was in power maintained a high number of multiple-
office holders in power, especially Democrats. The abrupt end of multiple-office 
holding, then, in the context of the executive branch, follows logically. As 
McGreevey lost control of his life and his office and spiraled into disgrace, 
Senator Jon Corzine began assembling allies, and eventually took over the office. 
The following chapter will go into more detail about the evidence for the power 
struggle between former McGreevey allies who are multiple-office holders and 
Corzine’s team, but the surge and sudden ban of multiple-office holding can be 
very much attributed to the rise and fall of Jim McGreevey. 
Multiple-Office Holding Beyond Time: Party and Gender 
  Statistics collected from the New Jersey Legislative Manuals regarding 
party and gender, while showing slight biases, do not lead very far. Post-ban the 
Democrats do have a fairly significant lead in both multiple-office holders and   44 
overall number, but this is greatly exacerbated by developments both in local and 
national politics throughout the tenure of the Bush administration. Currently, the 
party breakdown in both chambers favors Democrats to Republicans 59% to 41%, 
with the multiple-office holder breakdown being 63% to 37% in favor of the 
Democrats.  
 
Figure 3 above displays party breakdown in the NJ Legislature by party in 
percentages over the past two decades. Here it is clear that the number of 
multiple-office holders from each party is extremely dependent on the number of 
legislators from either party being elected, so that multiple-office holding is not a 
factor influencing the number of individuals per party in the legislature, but vice 
versa. Since party affiliation is a characteristic highly dependent on beliefs and   45 
issues, it would follow that in multiple-office holding, a phenomenon deeply 
linked to political machines, issues would take a secondary, if any, position. 
Should there have been a correlation between multiple-office holding and party 
ID such that one party was guilty of the practice consistently more than the other, 
the number of Republicans holding dual offices would not have risen over that of 
the Democrats in times such as most of the 1990s, when Republicans were 
stronger on a national and state level thanks to the efforts of the national party 
with projects such as the Contract with America, etc. It should be noted, however, 
that the rise in Republican multiple-office holders seems to have preceded the 
Contract with America and the 1994 midterm elections, beginning in 1991 while 
George H.W. Bush was still president. This was also during Democrat James 
Florio’s term as governor. The rise in Republican multiple-office holders, and 
Republicans in general, in the Assembly and Senate could be attributed, however, 
to unhappiness with the current executive government of the time, especially 
since Florio took office in between two of the most popular Republican governors 
of the state, Thomas Kean, Sr. and Christine Todd Whitman. 
  Moreover, even if the numbers would have been consistently more 
Democratic, there is no reason for a law banning multiple-office holding to be 
passed at a time when the Democrats were especially benefiting from the practice. 
While this does explain in part why many of the most vocal actors in the 
opposition against dual office holding are Republicans (Thomas Kean, Jr.; Joseph 
Kyrillos), it does not explain the reason for the law passing at all when so many 
Democrats have so much at stake in the legislature. Moreover, Corzine’s attempts   46 
at reducing the power of McGreevey allies put him at odds with his own party, 
such that the leader of the Democratic leader in the state was consistently in 
accord with Republicans. This type of dispute weakens party ID and cohesion 
such that it becomes less relevant. Additionally, this does not coincide with the 
view held by many Republicans who value the tradition of having someone 
deeply interested in municipal politics have a say on the state level and did not 
consider this opinion a desertion of the party.  
Gender, as previously mentioned, appears to be an even less relevant 
factor in the issue. Women independent of how many offices they have are 
notably underrepresented in the NJ Legislature, with a grand total of seven female 
multiple-office holders serving in the legislature in the past two decades (four of 
them in the 2000s). There was also no specific correlation between gender and 
party ID as a factor for multiple-office holding together, as there simply has not 
been enough gender diversity in the history of the New Jersey Legislature for any 
study to provide valuable evidence. 
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CHAPTER 3: The NJ Multiple-Office Holding Ban as a 2008 Novelty 
  The latter years of the first decade in the 21
st century proved to be the 
most welcoming towards multiple-office holding for most—if not all—of New 
Jersey legislative history, and far and away the most welcoming for the post-1947 
Constitutional history of the state. For most of the state’s history, legislators were 
elected from the counties and not legislative districts designed to represent more 
people and adapt to the immigration explosion that the state began to experience 
in the 1970s and continues to enjoy. This has quite predictably had an impact on 
that number. However, even taking into consideration this great change in the 
state’s history, the rise is unprecedented. Moreover, although this does not fit into 
the scope of our study, the increase in multiple-office holders in the state has been 
emulated in almost every aspect of local politics, mostly through freeholder 
positions, and most prominently in the urban counties.  
  Laws had threatened to end the practice since the days of the newest 
(1947) state constitution, yet had never materialized despite being often a topic of 
conversation when corruption was the topic at hand (O’Neill 2007, 6). What, then, 
was so special about that period in 2007 when the law finally ended the practice 
(sort of)? This next chapter proposes that the reason behind such a bill passing 
was a combination of the legislature succumbing to the threats of Governor Jon 
Corzine enacting another crippling government shutdown if they did not ban it 
and their own need to cash in on some political capital that was long overdue 
since the days of disgraced ex-governor Jim McGreevey (Schwaneberg). In the 
next few pages we will explore the law itself and the legislators both promoting   48 
and opposing it, as well as the individuals that elected the people responsible for 
practicing and banning multiple-office holding and for electing Jon Corzine the 
governor, an individual staunchly in favor of the ban to the point of using 
blackmail to achieve it. 
Multiple-Office Holding in the 21
st Century 
  The greatest number of multiple-office holders serving simultaneously in 
the New Jersey legislature, according to data I acquired from the NJ State 
Archives and the Legislative Manual, is 24. This number has occurred twice in NJ 
history: in 2002 and 2006. Beyond the research from the Legislative Manuals, this 
figure is corroborated by numbers from the Center for Public Integrity cited in 
O’Neill’s One to a Customer, which declare that at least 20 legislators hold more 
than one elected office, and also cite that a third of the individuals in the 
legislature receive a salary from another government job, elected or otherwise (6). 
Due to retirements and a phase shift in the next year, this number dropped to 22 in 
2007, still one of the highest in state history. After the ban, according to the 
calculations explained previously, only 14 multiple-office holders were left (this 
figure does not coincide with the one in the Star-Ledger article—they arrived at 
an increase from 17 to 19—but as they do not explain their metric for arriving at 
this number, for the purposes of this study I will continue to believe that the 
number declined). Of the Class of 2007 multiple-office holders, two were women 
(9%), five (23%) were of an ethnic minority, and two of the legislators (9%) were 
new to the legislature. None of these factors appear to have any significant impact 
on multiple-office holders or have any bearing on the significance and origin of   49 
the phenomenon. Women in New Jersey politics are one of the more elusive types 
in the state’s political configuration, and so gender in the state’s political scene 
has never had the opportunity to evolve into a factor distinguishable from other 
due to simply to tiny sample size. Minority representatives are more prevalent but 
still have yet to demonstrate significantly different styles of governing, and as the 
legislature’s minority officials come from all sorts of backgrounds—from 
African-American Ronald Rice (D-Essex) to Cuban-American Silverio Vega (D-
Hudson) to Indian-American Uprenda Chivukula (D-Somerset)—generalizing 
their government styles appears a dangerous path to take. Moreover, in an 
argument that this study will explore more in-depth in Chapter 5, if multiple-
office holding is a product of machines, which feed indiscriminately on 
immigrants and in their leadership also demonstrate no preference for any 
particular ethnic background, then there should be no impact on the practice by 
ethnicity. Bob Ingle, the Trenton bureau chief for Gannett newspapers and co-
author of New Jersey corruption study The Soprano State, corroborated this claim 
in an online interview with me in December 2008. “Dual-office holding is an 
outgrowth of the machines,” he explained, and he has not found any evidence 
indicating that politicians of any particular ethnic background are more prone to 
holding more than one office than others. “What matters,” explains Ingle (and this 
study will grapple with this argument in the coming chapters), “is that they are 
team players and do the machine’s work. In some areas there may be more of one 
group or another but that’s probably because there are more of those people to 
begin with and would tend to control politics.”   50 
  As for the composition of both chambers, 15 (68%) of the multiple-office 
holders held office in the Assembly, and 7 (32%) in the Senate.
12 The same 
breakdown occurs for party ID: 68% Democrats and 32% Republicans. The 
percentages divided by chamber are almost exactly the same as the percentage of 
each chamber that makes up the whole legislature (two thirds of the legislature is 
comprised of the assembly, while one third of it is comprised of 40 senators). The 
party ID delineations, however, are significantly skewed in favor of the 
Democrats. While the legislature is divided quite predictably 60-40 in favor of the 
Democrats on the whole, there is almost a 10% difference weighing the scale in 
favor of the Democrats when it comes to multiple-office holders. It still holds, 
however, that multiple-office holding has nothing to do with party when viewing 
years where the Republicans had control of the legislature. Take, for example, 
1992: a year when a national shift to the left placed Bill Clinton in the country’s 
highest office, and yet of the multiple-office holders serving in the NJ legislature, 
60% were Republicans.  
  Within the 2006-2007 crop of multiple-office holders, most were 
incumbents that had been in office for only a short amount of time prior, usually 
just one term. Within this group of politicians there were, however, some 
important outliers, as most of the individuals that remain for a long time in the 
                                                 
12 There are two main issues that may affect the much greater number of dual-
office assemblymen than senators. The first is, of course, that the Assembly is a 
larger body, and thus a greater number of individuals could potentially fill the 
criteria for multiple-office holding in the Assembly than the Senate. The other 
issue is that the role of senator, due to it being an upper chamber and the number 
of individuals presiding in it being more minimal, is a job that requires a greater 
amount of time and dedication, thus leading towards more of these individuals to 
dedicate the entirety of their time to one position.   51 
legislature tend to rise to important chairing positions and gain clout within the 
organization. Looking through the list of multiple-office holders there were 
definitely specific names that stood out as lasting presences in the political scene. 
Of these, Republican Leonard Connors perhaps stands the tallest. Connors is most 
notable for being the mayor of Surf City, NJ, a small coastal town on Long Beach 
Island that does not quite make one square mile and, as of the 2000 US Census, 
has a population of about 1,400. This position, which he has held since 1966 and 
continues to hold, he first held in conjunction with a position on the Ocean 
County Board of Chosen Freeholder in 1977. He later moved up to a position in 
the General Assembly, and most notably served as mayor and state senator from 
1982 to 2008, when he retired from the Senate. Another significant character that 
continued to recur in the history books is Senator Robert Singer. Singer is 
currently the mayor of Lakewood Township, a much larger (+60,000 in 
population compared to Surf City) and diverse town, known as a Jewish-
American enclave in the city and a popular resort for travelers looking for a 
summer retreat from New York City. Singer has been this town’s mayor on-and-
off since 1983, and has only experienced dual-office holding as a member of the 
legislature, initially as an assemblyman in 1986, and as a senator since 1993. 
  In contrast, the Democrats that stand out seem to have a much more 
extensive record of dual-office holding beyond the legislature. Take Senator 
Nicholas Sacco. In many ways, District 33 State Senator, North Bergen mayor, 
assistant superintendent of schools, and former elementary school principal 
Nicholas Sacco embodies the worst nightmares of the more genuine sponsors   52 
(considering that former Newark mayor Sharpe James was responsible for 
bringing the bill to the state senate) of the multiple-office holding ban. His 
biographical sketch in the New Jersey Legislative Manuals modestly omits many 
of the titles he once simultaneously held or glosses over them, citing that the 
mayor has, for example, a “background in education.” Given his extremely 
pervasive presence in education, Sacco’s name and semblance is one that anyone 
who went to school in North Bergen in the 1990s (the researcher herself received 
her 8
th grade diploma from the mayor) recalls fondly. With his Winter Festivals, 
Nights Out Against Crime, and myriad reading assemblies and children events, 
Sacco has developed the image of a shadier, slightly more malevolent Santa Claus 
to those who have grown up under his tenure.. Despite a very thorough effort 
vigorously chronicled by the Bergen Record, New Jersey’s US attorney Chris 
Christie has yet to pound on his door, though he has taken care of more than a few 
weeds in his backyard (Samson 2008). Around him have been swept into the 
depths of the corruption underworld individuals like Joseph Auriemma, a former 
top official in the city caught over-billing several municipal contracts to launder 
money used on improving his home in 2002 (Smothers 2008) and Peter Perez, a 
former commissioner of parks and recreation indicted for the same home 
improvement violations as Auriemma (Samson 2008). 
Another prominent character to appear in this 2007 crop of legislators is 
Ronald Rice, a Democrat from Newark who has been in the State Senate since 
1986 and has held various leadership roles and had several titles in city 
government, from City Councilman to deputy mayor. He is currently not a   53 
multiple-office holder, since he gave up his deputy mayorship to run for the top 
job in the city (he has since lost to Cory Booker). While his sound defeat to the 
protagonist of an Academy Award-nominated documentary removed him from 
our topic at hand, his persistence on our yearly list of individuals which hold more 
than one office generates a mystique around him emulated only in those that have 
been around the legislature in more than one capacity long enough to comprehend 
the repercussions of this. 
Double-Dipping and the “Republican” Opposition 
  With 24 individuals in the New Jersey legislature reaping the benefits of 
dual offices, among them members with the star- and political power of Connors, 
Sacco, et al, a law passing that limited the scope of their influence when the 
practice was most common seems highly unlikely. Yet it is pertinent to keep in 
mind that, while 24 is still the highest number of multiple-office holders in recent 
New Jersey legislative history, it is still a small figure compared to the other 96 
individuals in office that do not split their time between their hometowns and 
Trenton. And not all legislators are comfortable with the fact that others within 
the legislature practice this politics and, furthermore, create a clique within 
themselves of representatives that see legislating in a different light. Senator 
Sacco, for example, cited Mayor Connors as an unlikely ally, reaching across 
party lines because they both shared an understanding of local executive 
government. “We often tend to look at certain bills in ways different from other 
members,” he explains, “Lenny [Connors] helped me pass a bill I would never get   54 
passed because of party, because he understood. Closing bars, stabbings, etc… the 
mayor on the committee understood.”
13 
The most prominent voice in favor of the ban is, contrary to the 
anticipated, not a Republican. Governor Jon Corzine had been pushing for quite 
some time for the legislature to ban the measure, and proved to have the most 
influence to force the bill through. Corzine had not publicly explained his 
objection to dual-office holding in any of the state’s larger media outlets 
particularly explicitly, citing only that “this issue of dual-office holding is one of 
serious concern for the public… I think it’s emblematic of conflict and 
incompatibility of making decisions that come from representing two different 
constituencies” (Guenther 2007). As for his actions on the matter, he had publicly 
stated that he was going to “push on” the matter, citing it as an issue that people 
were extremely interested in seeing discussed by their representatives (McNichol 
2007). Corzine even threatened at one point that he “would have trouble” signing 
that year’s fiscal budget if within the new set of bills being proposed there were 
not one prohibiting dual-office holding (he later had to retract his demand for a 
complete ban and settle for the grandfather bill due to lack of support in the 
legislature) (McNichol 2007, Hluchan 2007, Smothers 2002). Unlike in most 
states, a threat from Governor Corzine to shut down the entire state government is 
not one to be taken lightly, as the legislature found out the hard way the summer 
                                                 
13 The bill in discussion would close bars at an earlier date to decrease the number 
of violent crimes related to alcohol consumption in cities. Senator Sacco 
explained that the opposition to this bill rose to defend the bars as legitimate 
businesses with which the government should not interfere, but the mayors on the 
committee where he drafted the bill understood that, beyond freedom, this was a 
matter of safety.   55 
before. In early July 2006, the governor signed an executive order that shut down 
most of the state’s government, excluding essential components of it such as 
prisons and the state police. Among the “non-essential” bureaus affected by the 
shutdown were the Department of Motor Vehicles and state courts and the state’s 
parks, beaches, and casinos (Jones 2006). This left about 45,000 of the state’s 
employees unable to work, and cost the casinos—one of the major sources of 
government income thanks to the resort area in Atlantic City—$2 million in 
government income per day that they were closed (“Casinos” 2006). The reason 
behind this unprecedented halt in the state government was a simple one: taxes. 
Corzine proposed increases in taxes on cigarettes, alcohol, luxury cars, and the 
sales tax. The latter became the crux issues in the government shutdown; 7% was 
simply too high for the legislature at that time (Chen 2006), especially given 
Corzine’s reputation (Corzine raised taxes by almost $2 billion in his first six 
months in office (Ingle 2008, 273)). 
  This rift between those legislators that held multiple offices and those that 
did not created quite a vocal opposition in the Republican party of the state, which 
at the time was the minority party and one that was not equally reaping the 
benefits of two titles. A tight-knit group of them went on a publicity tour once the 
bill was drafted and passed, awaiting the governor’s signature, first and foremost 
among them Senator Thomas Kean, Jr
14. of the 21
st District, which consists of a 
substantial portion of Central Jersey including Essex, Union, Morris, and 
Somerset Counties. Kean criticized the bill that passed for having a provision 
                                                 
14 Kean is the son of former Republican governor Thomas Kean, Sr.   56 
allowing those that already were serving two terms to be grandfathered in, stating 
to the Star-Ledger that “it’s clear that half-measures don’t work.” He immediately 
began drafting a bill that completely forbade multiple-office holding, but it was 
not considered seriously by a legislature who had already discussed the situation 
and passed a bill so recently (Schwaneberg 2007).  Senator Joseph Kyrillos, 
another Republican from the coastal 13
th District, has also been a very vocal 
member of the fight against multiple-office holding. He has called the ban a “no-
brainer” in the New York Times and, while not expressing the same type of 
outrage that Senator Kean has against the final version of the bill, has been 
equally vocal in the banning process. The same could be said of Assemblywoman 
Jennifer Beck of the 12
th District, who gave several public statements on the 
matter in a similar vein of those fellow Republicans Kean and Kyrillos gave, 
having drafted a complete ban, without a grandfather clause, on the practice, but it 
was never considered by her colleagues. She later attacked one of the softer bills 
proposed against it, claiming that she did “not congratulate [those in favor of the 
bill] on [their] abandonment of principles” (Pizarro “Senate” 2007). Other 
significant voices in the passing of the bill include Senate President Richard 
Codey, Assemblyman Gary Chiusano (R-Sussex), Senator Kevin O’Toole (R-
Essex), and, outside of the legislature, political science professor at Rutgers Alan 
Rosenthal (Smothers 2008, Schwaneberg 2008, Pizarro “Senate” 2007). Of 
course, in addition to these voices, Senators Ellen Karcher and Sharpe James, 
both Democrats of the 12
th and 29
th Districts, respectively (and James the mayor 
of Newark at the time), and Assemblywoman Linda Greenstein of the 14
th   57 
district—the sponsors of the bill in their respective chambers—had a very 
important hand in the passing, if not a prominent place in the state’s media. 
The 2007 Political Forecast: Cloudy with a Chance of Subpoenas 
  Despite now having an idea of who the protagonists in this saga were at 
the time and how many and how vocal the multiple-office holders of 2007 were, 
we still cannot explain just what caused the politicians that opposed the practice 
to unite and pass a bill at this time as opposed to any other, given how perennial 
of an issue multiple-office holding has been in New Jersey history. The reasoning 
behind the strength of the argument against it very much stems from the political 
climate in which officials relatively new to the office, Jon Corzine being foremost 
among these, were thrust. 
  A year may have passed between the law’s passing and the establishment 
of a new executive government, but New Jersey was still reeling from the 
destructive departure of Governor James McGreevey, who had left in ignominy 
on November 15, 2005 proclaiming that his homosexuality had prevented him 
from finishing his term. In a way, it was, since his affair with his Israeli 
Homeland Security Advisor (salary: $110,000), Golan Cipel, was the straw that 
broke the camel’s back with regard to the outrageous corruption within his 
administration (Ingle 45), not so much because they had engaged in what 
McGreevey called a “consensual homosexual affair” in his final press conference 
as governor (McGreevey 2004), but because the six-figure administrator of one of 
the most important positions in state government had nothing in his resume that 
“would cause any rational person to think he was a terrorism expert” (Ingle 2008,   58 
45). Beyond that, there was little reason to believe that McGreevey had resigned 
exclusively because of his recent discovery regarding his sexual orientation. 
Several mysterious expenses on the government’s tab already had the federal 
authorities swarming around his administration trying to find proof of illegal 
activity, much of it relating to travel. For example, McGreevey claimed to have 
spent around $20,000 on a “trade mission” to Ireland. In reality, the governor 
ended up spending at least $105,000 on telephone fees and a large-scale family 
reunion (Ingle 2008, 48). Moreover, the former mayor of Woodbridge and State 
Senator (simultaneously!) had surrounded himself with a crew of fundraisers that 
many rumor led to his demise way before anyone knew about his relationship 
with Cipel. First and foremost among these was Charles Kushner, the leader of a 
“billion-dollar real estate empire” (Horowitz 2004) and major campaign 
contributor to McGreevey’s campaign. Around the same time that McGreevey 
faced his resignation, Kushner was charged with witness tampering, obstruction 
of justice, and promoting prostitution for an attempted at weakening the 
testimonies of his sister and brother-in-law against his companies. More 
specifically, Kushner had paid a prostitute $10,000 to seduce his brother-in-law 
and record the affair on tape. He sent his sister the tape just before a family party 
(Horowitz 2004; Ingle 2008, 51). 
  It may be speculated that this type of scandal is the reason for Jon 
Corzine’s sweeping win in the 2006 elections despite running within the same 
party that McGreevey had emerged from—he seemed to have enough money not 
to need to be corrupt, especially considering that McGreevey was neither the first   59 
nor the last to be convicted of corruption in the court of public opinion (if not by 
state officials). Yet the levels of comfort with Corzine were not exactly stable at 
the time. According to a poll recently released by Quinnipiac University spanning 
most of Corzine’s tenure puts his approval ratings at 35% in April 2005, and 
maintain them around those numbers until a one-year period in which Corzine 
established himself passed, leaving him with 51% approval rating the month 
before the multiple-office holding ban passed (Richards 5).  
  Thus the reasons for Corzine to support a ban on dual-office holding are 
two-fold: on the one hand, he entered the office suffering in popularity due to the 
corruption of others surrounding the office previously, and thus needed to find a 
way to superficially deal with the issue of corruption without implicating himself 
or his position. As he himself held two extremely powerful offices in the state and 
his approval certainly did hinge upon the fact that many people saw him as an 
insider with a decent amount of money, clarifying his name by vigorously 
promoting anti-corruption laws that were of a bipartisan appeal was a healthy 
option for his career at the time. On the other hand, preventing legislators from 
accumulating power, especially when it amounted to double constituencies and 
resources to communicate with them, appears to greatly benefit the executive 
branch, not solely because it weakens the checks on it, but also because it affects 
approval ratings. Limiting legislative power rarely lacks support from people 
(remember the well-known axiom that the masses always love their congressman 
but hate Congress). Around the time that Corzine’s approval was at 35%, the 
legislature suffered from a 20% approval rating, according to the same study.   60 
Over the next two years, its highest approval rating was 41% in January 2005 
(Richards 5). This way, Corzine takes care of two birds with one stone: he 
weakens potential rivals by taking away their privileges from a second office and 
curries the favor of a public that is rarely inclined to support the legislature over 
the executive. 
  As for the legislature, Corzine partially blackmailed them into agreeing to 
the ban by threatening to shut down the state yet again, but for many in the 
minority party who were not multiple-office holders, limiting the power of others 
in the legislature that potentially voted against their bills while appearing to their 
constituency as capable of bipartisanship, there was nothing but political capital to 
gain. 
The Law of the Land: Results 
  Given the powers at play in the reshuffling of multiple-office holding 
powers, the law that actually came of all this seems a reasonable conclusion with 
which to end the chronological study of the demise of multiple-office holding in 
New Jersey. The version of the bill that passed through the New Jersey legislature 
was sponsored, as previously mentioned, by Assemblywoman Linda Greenstein, 
and initially lists the offices that one cannot hold simultaneously: most major 
federal offices, state legislatives offices, county clerk, register, surrogate, or 
sheriff. It later states explicitly: “No person shall hold at the same time more than 
one elective public office in this State or a political subdivision or instrumentality 
thereof.” Most curiously, however, this version of the bill states that “This act 
shall take effect on January 8, 2008, and any elected official holding more than   61 
one elective public office on that effective date shall resign from all but one 
office.” The Senate version of the bill, sponsored by Senator Ellen Karcher (R-12) 
and Newark Mayor Sharpe James (D-29), directly opposes this section of the 
Assembly bill, stating: “a person who, on the effective date… holds 
simultaneously an elective county office and an elective municipal office may 
continue to hold the elective offices simultaneously if service in those elective 
offices is continuous following the effective date.” As we now know, this 
provision was maintained in the final document and is the only major difference 
between the Assembly’s draft and the final product.  
  The conclusion that this study achieves through researching the setting for 
this bill and the powers that surrounded its birth is that the grandfather law came 
about because of increased animosity towards the law from state senators, who 
are individually more powerful and often have longer histories of multiple-office 
holding. This is, of course, in addition to the aforementioned theory that the 
explosion of corruption followed the resignation of Governor McGreevey created 
an atmosphere such that it was advantageous for Corzine to support such a bill 
and goad the legislature into passing it. For example, an article describing the 
deliberations on the bill in the Senate describes the opposition from Newark 
Senator Ronald Rice as “infuriated.” “"I’ve been here 21 years and I’m tired of 
hearing that dual office holding is conflicting," he declared to the Senate. In the 
end, however, only two senators voted in opposition to the bill—Senator Robert 
Martin, a Republican close to retirement, and Senator Nicholas Sacco, who 
seemed genuinely perplexed at Corzine’s staunch intent to remove multiple-office 
holding from New Jersey political culture. Sacco, Max Pizarro from Politicker NJ 
duly notes, need not worry about tainting his reputation with a constituency that   62 
elected him with an 80% in his last mayoral election ( “Senate Passes” 2007). 
Many of those dual-office holders that were less confident in their ability to get 
reelected no matter what became a quiet voice of dissidence within the legislature, 
such as Union City Mayor and Assemblyman Brian Stack and West New York 
Mayor and Assemblyman Silverio Vega. Stack, citing that “it makes [him] a 
better legislator to know local government,” abstained from voting on the bill. 
Vega, who voted against the bill, also cited that he did not take any issue with an 
individual holding more than one public office (Pizarro “GOP” 2007). 
  In investigating the individuals working in favor or against laws that ban 
multiple-office holding, it has probably become clear that distinguishing why 
multiple-office holding has taken such a prominent place in New Jersey politics 
and why it was precisely in 2008 that this law passed are difficult questions to 
answer. Furthermore, searching for the answers exclusively on the basis of party 
affiliation has not clarified every significant aspect of this phenomenon; after all, 
it was Corzine who had to push his own Democrats in the legislature to pass the 
bill. To better understand how these bills were crafted and passed and, on a deeper 
level, where this multiple-office holding tradition stems from, it is important to 
resist the temptation to view New Jersey as a politically homogenous unit. In an 
interview for this study, Gannett Trenton Bureau Chief Bob Ingle stated that he 
believed “New Jersey is so small geographically, it doesn’t seem to make a 
difference. Camden County and Essex County and Bergen County have machines. 
But so does more rural Ocean and Burlington.” Thus Ingle reintroduces a concept 
that had little import in our chronological study of multiple-office holding: the   63 
machine. To comprehend the role of the machine in multiple-office holding and 
flesh out the argument that Corzine needed to push to pass the bill in an attempt to 
combat open “machine politics,” it must be noted that Ingle could not have been 
more incorrect in his assumption. If time is but half the story, then place—where 
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PART 2: A Geographical Survey of Multiple-Office Holding in New Jersey 
CHAPTER 4: Mapping Out Multiple-Office Holding 
  In the past two chapters we have been able to experience the evolution of 
multiple-office holding through time in the state and arrived at various 
conclusions: party identification, gender, ethnic background, and chamber of the 
legislature in which multiple-office holders exist seem to have very little impact 
on their numbers and governing styles. The number of multiple-office holders in 
the Legislature had been swelling steadily across time even taking into 
consideration the adoption of a new state constitution and the increasing number 
of representatives until state legislative districts were adopted. The new 
millennium—the years before the ban—saw a spike in the number of multiple-
office holders with the rise of mayor of Woodbridge and state senator for the 19
th 
District Jim McGreevey to the state’s highest office, and an eventual termination 
of the practice by a law passed under Jon Corzine, the former US Senator who 
eventually replaced McGreevey and launched a campaign to restore legitimacy to 
the governor’s office.  
  Thus a great deal of the understanding of multiple-office holding and its 
demise in New Jersey that we now have is related to its place in New Jersey 
history and the political climate of the time. Since the aforementioned data 
demonstrated a negligible if any relationship between multiple-office holding and 
gender, race or party, this narrows our list of possible factors involved in the 
development of multiple-office holding and leaves us with a very suspicious-
looking culprit: geography. This, however, leaves many unanswered questions, 
especially when trying to analyze what kind of politicians are more likely to hold   65 
simultaneous offices and what kind of socioeconomic and local political situations 
would make it more likely for voters to identify and feel comfortable with a leader 
with several hats, so to speak. I propose to dedicate the following two chapters to 
the relationship between local political cultures within New Jersey and the 
number and type of dual office holders in the legislature over time. Before any 
argument can be made on who arrives at these titles and how they get there, 
however, an analysis must be made of New Jersey state geography in relation to 
multiple-office holding. First I will show data from the New Jersey Legislative 
Manuals over time as they pertain to the geographic distribution of multiple-
office holders in the state and demonstrate that multiple-office holding is much 
more likely to occur in areas where the population density is higher, more 
individuals live under the poverty line, the percentage of foreign-born and first-
generation immigrants is higher, and there is an established tradition of political 
machines. As discussed in the introduction, multiple-office holding and the study 
thereof is very deeply linked to the development of political machines, as it occurs 
only in New Jersey at these exorbitant rates, a state whose politics is studied most 
to understand the development of political machines in urban communities. In 
proving this I intend to make a more thorough point on the individuals running for 
these offices: mostly, but not entirely, powerful local politicians who need the 
second job to expand their constituencies and gain benefits to distribute as 
patronage to their most loyal subjects. While the issue of pensions is an important 
one that the anti-multiple-office holding GOP lobby poses as one of its favorites, I 
will argue that this is a secondary issue to the expansion of constituencies and   66 
appreciation distributed to loyalists. The issue of patronage also explains why 
New Jersey, despite having the greatest number of individuals who hold at least 
two public jobs simultaneously, also has the greatest number of overall 
government jobs, 81 government workers per square mile, as opposed to the 
national average of 6 (Ingle 2007, 5). To confirm what was previously established 
as per the entire state in Chapter 3, I will also demonstrate that the distribution of 
multiple-office holders across party lines per county is on a similar, if not 
identical, level to that of legislators as a whole, and thus multiple-office holding 
being skewed to one party or another is merely a consequence of the popularity of 
one party over another in any given time. This will allow the study to continue in 
the next chapter to how the distribution of dual office holders per county affected 
the legislature such that the ban on multiple-office holding occurred during the 
Corzine era. 
District Evaluations: 1988-2008 
  In my interview with Bob Ingle in December 2008, Gannett Trenton 
bureau chief, he gave us two main overarching arguments that were the impetus 
for the following evaluations. First, multiple-office holding is exclusively a 
product of the expansion of political machines across a state: “people who aren’t 
connected don’t get [the positions].” Machine bosses needed to expand their 
influence across greater constituencies, and thus accumulated more titles. While 
this argument does align somewhat with this study’s conclusion that the need to 
become a multiple-office holder is a product of the desire to expand the 
constituency, the conclusion that this is exclusively a product of machines   67 
excludes many multiple-office holders who can be considered machine bosses but 
hold positions within parties instead of public positions (i.e. former NJ 
Democratic Party Chairman Raymond Lesniak (D-Union)) and those who hold 
dual positions who show no signs of being involved in something that could be 
remotely labeled an urban political machine (i.e. Mayor Leonard Connors (R-
Ocean)). 
  The other observation Mr. Ingle made to us via email regarding the power 
of machine politicians in multiple offices is that the issue is uniform across almost 
all possible variables. Taking machines and multiple-office holders to be different 
facets of the same phenomenon, he explained: “I have found no connection 
between machines and their ethnic, religion [sic], or racial background. What 
matters is that they are team players and do the machine’s work.” Beyond this, he 
elaborated. “New Jersey is so small geographically, it doesn’t seem to make a 
difference. Camden County and Essex County and Bergen County have machines. 
But so do more rural Ocean and Burlington.”  
  Before tackling the issue of the indelible relationship between machines 
and multiple-office holding, it is important to take a look at the distribution of 
multiple-office holders across the state. In order to have a reasonable estimate of 
the recent distribution of them over time, I have created the following map using 
data from the 1988-2008 editions of the New Jersey Legislative Manual. Since the 
number of multiple-office holders has remained constant in the past 20 years, I 
did not find it necessary to go by percentages but, rather, by pure number of 
individuals who participate in this practice. The number variations among   68 
different districts are also reliably on similar scales because each district has had 
the same number of opportunities to elect multiple-office holders. The darker 
regions represent areas where there have been a greater number of multiple-office 
holders in the past 20 years. In putting together these numbers, I chose to count 
individuals multiple times that appeared in different years, so that someone that 
had been around all 20 years would count 20 times. I did this because I believed it 
would counteract the bias inherent in the map with the fact that only up to three 
individuals can be multiple-office holders per district at a time. As you can see, 
the map seems to immediately demonstrate that multiple-office holding is not at 
all a statewide issue. Most of northwestern New Jersey and the southern tip seem 
to have little going on in that realm. What’s more, it appears that the northeastern 
area close to New York City and some areas in the south are the biggest culprits. 
The darkest area, District 30, includes the part of Mercer County that Trenton is 
located in. 
  Trying to find a similar state pattern with which to compare the 
geographic composition, I juxtaposed a map showing population density of the 
state to the multiple-office holder map previously discussed on the previous page 
as well. The data was taken from the 2000 Census as this is the closest we could 
get to the middle of the time span (1988-2008) with which we are interested. This 
would thus be the closest to an average of population density given that the 
population of New Jersey is consistently on the rise with little acceleration. The 
comparison based on visual impression alone demonstrates an undeniable 
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Essex, and Hudson Counties (Districts numbered in the late 20s- 30s) are strongly 
represented with multiple-office holders. These are also the state’s most densely 
populated areas, as well as the nation’s (as per the 2000 US Census, Union City, 
NJ, at the heart of Hudson County, is the most densely populated city in the 
nation. It is followed by three of its neighbors: Guttenberg, West New York, and 
North Bergen). The Trenton area and Central Jersey also stand out as the 30
th 
District. These areas are all moderate-to-extreme in population density, with 
Camden County as perhaps the greatest exception of a fairly densely populated 
area with relatively few multiple-office holders. There also appears to be a pocket 
of low density in the 20
th District that is both surrounded by high-population areas 
and experiences a moderately high level of multiple-office holding. 
  There are several natural discrepancies to consider when evaluating the 
number of multiple-office holders by congressional district. For one, as mentioned 
previously, the maximum number of multiple-office holders in one district at any 
given time is always three, two in the Assembly and one in the Senate. This caps 
the number of potential office-holders in such a way that areas with a culture that 
would be more likely to accept this in this and other realms would be 
underrepresented. Additionally, areas that are linked by county, Congressional 
district, general political culture or population density are not adequately 
represented. Some areas where it would be feasible to have more than this number 
of dual office holders are capped by the district. Alternatively, areas where 
multiple-office holding isn’t common but are linked by district to areas that are 
open to this seem to be more involved in this practice than they really are. For   71 
example, District 30 is the darkest region in New Jersey according to our map, yet 
outside of Trenton it appears that population density is quite low. This is because 
individuals keep being elected from the Trenton area that already have offices 
there are taint the numbers for other areas of Mercer, Monmouth, and Burlington 
Counties. In order to diffuse these issues somewhat more, in the third figure 
presented on Page 5 the same data is restructured by county rather than by 
Congressional district. While, on the one hand, counties are larger areas than 
districts, because of the nature of Freeholder titles and because many divisions 
span and combine counties that have similar political cultures, it is clearer to see 
in this image a more accurate representation of multiple-office holders across the 
state. On a statewide scale the county map matches the population map much 
more than the district map. Two significant factors to attribute to the increased 
accuracy and legitimacy of the county map to the district map regard the nature of 
the district themselves. The reason the state is divided into representative districts 
to begin with as opposed to the way it was done in the past (simply by county) is 
to assure more equal representation. Districts are divided into sections of 
relatively equal populations. This severely dilutes the usefulness of a map with 
equally populated subdivisions if population itself was a factor being taken into 
consideration. Furthermore, the prospect of gerrymandering the districts tampers 
with the legitimacy of the study, whether the gerrymandering occurred for the 
sake of party support or, more likely in a diverse state like New Jersey, in order to 
create districts more likely to elect minority members.    72 
  Thus it is clear that the map divided by county would coincide more 
accurately with the map divided by district, as the three images on Page 66 
demonstrate. It also becomes increasingly clear that multiple-office holding is not 
completely a statewide issue. District 3, for example, when divided into 
Gloucester, Salem, Cumberland, and a tiny sliver of Camden County, appears 
almost completely devoid of multiple-office holding, to the increase in number of 
Camden County. It is also noticeably on the low end of the population scale, 
excepting the areas close to Camden County. The Essex-Hudson-Bergen power 
block of multiple-office holding, which is also the most densely populated area in 
America, is shown as the epicenter of the state’s multiple-office holding culture. 
The larger districts in that area by land also seem to have less multiple-office 
holding than the smaller ones, in large part probably due to this population issue. 
District 30 is also extremely diluted among Monmouth, Burlington, Ocean, and 
Mercer counties.  
Defining the Urban: Foreign-Born and Poverty-Stricken Population 
  Categorizing multiple-office holding as a majority-urban phenomenon 
requires defining urban sectors as something beyond areas with high population 
density, as the amount of people with which one is surrounded has little to no 
effect on the political landscape as an isolated factor. Other factors that define 
how most political scientists conceive of the concept of urban living must also 
come into play. In a place as culturally diverse as New Jersey, taking a look at the 
percentage of individuals that were born outside of the United States is a good 
way to measure the tight-knit ethnic communities. In this study we will also look   73 
at the number of individuals under the poverty line
15 in any given region. Poverty 
and the inner city have rarely been mutually exclusive issues, although, as we will 
encounter shortly, New Jersey is more of an urban state by its populous nature 
and proximity to major Northeastern capitals, and often some of the most poverty-
stricken communities in New Jersey can be found in the more rural sections. 
However, it is very important to take into consideration the amount of people that 
are needy and thus more vulnerable to government schemes that could involve 
machine politics, patronage, and, at least indirectly, multiple-office holding. To 
balance out this discrepancy, we will also look at the foreign-born population, 
which have traditionally migrated to the more urban communities by nature of the 
need for unskilled labor there. What’s more, if multiple-office holding really is, as 
Bob Ingle has argued, a product of machine politics, there must be a substantial 
immigrant population in play to manipulate and feed into the machine, especially 
if one is to believe in the standard machine of the area as depicted by Steven Erie 
et al in machine politics studies (see Chapter 1). New Jersey is also a 
spectacularly immigrant-friendly state. According to a study by the New Jersey 
State Office of Labor Planning and Analysis, “the total number of foreign-born 
persons increased 25 percent in New Jersey from 967,000 in 1990 to 1,208,000 in 
2000…only four other states – California, New York, Florida and Texas had more 
foreign-born persons than New Jersey” (Wu 2008, 1). 
                                                 
15 The definition of “poverty” as per the US Census Bureau’s website: “Following 
the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) Directive 14, the Census 
Bureau's Poverty Definition uses a set of money income thresholds that vary by 
family size and composition to detect who is poor. If a family’s total income is 
less than the family’s threshold, then that family, and every individual in it, is 
considered poor.”   74 
  On the following page is a table with the respective percentage of foreign-
born individuals per county and the percentage of individuals per county below 
the poverty line, organized in order of number of foreign-born individuals as both 
categories did seem to often coincide, and yet the disparities among counties in 
number of foreign-born individuals is significantly higher and is visually more 
comfortable to experience.
16 The findings highlight a few issues with defining 
urbanization that blur lines (income vs. expenditure evaluation of poverty, for 
example), but overall corroborate the results of the multiple-office studies above.  
Percentage of Foreign-Born and Poverty-Stricken Individuals in NJ, 2000 
 
                                                 
16 Since the US Census data available is already divided by county, I did not 
consider it necessary to find the information divided by legislative district, 
especially since these districts already pose a somewhat biased evaluation of the 
distribution of multiple-office holders.   75 
  Consulting the population of foreign-born individuals per county, it is 
abundantly clear that the pattern witnessed previously regarding population 
density and multiple-office holding also translates into the realm of foreign-born 
population. Hudson County, with 40.4% of individuals born abroad, comes in first 
place of both percentage of foreign-born residents in the population and number 
of multiple-office holders in the past 20 years (remember that studies have proven 
most foreign-born residents came into New Jersey after 1985). Bergen and 
Passaic Counties are the two runner-ups in the competition both in multiple-office 
holding and in number of foreign-born citizens, with Essex County lagging a bit 
behind Middlesex County, a county of a slightly smaller size in population 
density that makes up for that aspect of its nature (although mostly suburban but 
fairly populated) with its high number of residents born abroad. On the lower end 
of the spectrum are the usual suspects: Cape May and Salem Counties- places that 
rarely put a blip on our multiple-office holding radar, also have a very low 
percentage of individuals born abroad.  
  For the most part, it appears that the percentage of individuals living 
below the poverty line in any given county can also be an indicator of a higher 
probability of multiple-office holding politicians establishing a base there, but the 
statistics are less certain. There is evidence that poverty levels do interact with 
other statistics in way that are beneficial to our study. For example, being of a 
minority status in New Jersey greatly increases your probability of being below 
the poverty line. According to a study by the Legal Services of New Jersey 
Poverty Research Institute in December 2008, “the experience of poverty for   76 
Hispanics and African-Americans is three times the rate experiences by Whites” 
(LSN 2008, 36). The above chart demonstrates that, with regard to multiple-office 
holding, this is mostly true. For example, Hudson, Passaic, and Essex counties all 
have comparatively high rates of poverty as well as a great number of foreign-
born individuals, and are all among the most welcoming counties to multiple-
office holders. On the other side of the spectrum, Hunterdon, Morris, Warren, and 
Gloucester all have some of the lowest rates of poverty in the state and 
demonstrate little tolerance for multiple-office holding, especially in the past two 
decades. 
  The county dealing with the largest percentage of individuals below the 
poverty line, Cumberland County at 16%, stands nearly alone in defiance of the 
multiple-office holding trend. Cumberland, comprised of three cities, ten 
townships, and one borough and hours away from any major city, is not exactly 
what one would call “urban”. According to its tourist-attracting website 
(“Cumberland County- More to Offer!” 2008), Cumberland’s claim to fame is 
being the “Oyster Capital of the World” in the 19
th Century. In other words, 
Cumberland County isn’t exactly a bourgeoning metropolis, nor did it rank 
anywhere near the top of the multiple-office holding ladder. Yet it tops the list of 
poverty-stricken counties in America. This is in large part due to the fact that, in 
New Jersey, most of the more urban areas, especially the ones near the greater 
New York area, are quite expensive to live in, such that most people born and 
raised in the more suburban or urban communities of working class people in the 
state find little opportunity to leave, unless they can find an inexpensive place in a   77 
dangerous part of Newark or Camden. Thus, despite a small population and 
probably, judging by sheer population alone, not any major threats of crime or 
other inner-city problem, there are a number of areas in New Jersey that have a 
high number of individuals experiencing poverty in as close to a rural setting as 
New Jersey can offer. Most of these places are coastal retreats with little industry, 
such as Cumberland or Cape May Counties, although not all of them (i.e. Salem 
County) need to be on the shore. Moreover, many places where the number of 
individuals under the poverty line is high have a smaller job market which results 
in a higher number of unemployed individuals, something that, in a patronage-
laden multiple-office holding district, is not common. Multiple-office holders, 
especially those that adhere to the tenets of machine politics, are a strong 
contributing factor to the fact that New Jersey has 81 government workers per 
square mile. Thus, poverty as an independent factor seems to have little relation to 
multiple-office holding, though it does appear that, in an urban setting where the 
issues of poverty become inextricably linked with those of minority issues and 
problems that can easily be solved with patronage, poverty can be a salient issues.  
District 9 and Atlantic County: A Statewide Anomaly 
  In the entire examination of this geographic data, District 9, which 
corresponds to most of Ocean and some of Atlantic County, has been the elephant 
in the room. On both maps it appears extremely friendly to multiple–office 
holding, and as District 9 constitutes quite a large section of South Jersey it has 
the potential to tip the scale between the practice being a regional one rather than 
an issue relating to the entire state. Atlantic, the culprit county that makes District   78 
9 (and thus a large part of Ocean County that otherwise does not appear to be so 
favorable to the practice recently) look like such a core for the practice, also 
appears unusually tainted, but not to the extent of areas that are undeniably so. It 
is nowhere near the core region of multiple-office holding, but that would be 
forgivable if it weren’t for the other factors taken into consideration regarding 
urban areas—foreign-born population and number of individuals under the 
poverty line—and the blatant way that Atlantic County seems not to conform to 
this standard. With a 15% population of individuals born abroad, the area does 
have a slightly higher percentage than the national average, but significantly 
lower than most of the regions with the highest number of multiple-office holders. 
In the poverty division, since most of Atlantic County is coastal tourist spots that 
are profitable in the summer and rarely have a thriving job market in the winter, 
the numbers are slightly higher than most of the wealthy areas in New Jersey 
(Bergen, Morris, Somerset Counties), but still only at 13%- not very close to the 
numbers for Hudson, Passaic, and Essex Counties. Atlantic County, in other 
words, seems a bit too average to have the number of multiple-office holders it 
does. Yet Atlantic County has a treasure none of the other coastal counties have: 
Atlantic City. Atlantic City, a city of 40,000 famous for its tourist-attracting 
boardwalk and its long stretch of casinos and event venues across the coastline, 
does not host the kind of metropolitan area that some towns outside of New York 
or Philadelphia are capable of simply because of its placement far from almost 
every significant city in or around New Jersey, yet has the kind of urban statistic 
that would make Atlantic County as a whole relevant to the discussion on   79 
multiple-office holding. 26.1% of the population, as of 2007 estimates by the US 
Census, are foreign-born, and 22.5% of individuals living there are experiencing 
poverty. If Atlantic City itself were a county, it would rank higher than Essex 
County with number of foreign-born individuals and be the number one most 
poverty-stricken county in New Jersey. It has some significant potential to alter 
the statistics, despite the rest of the county not being particularly urban as defined 
above. 
  It should also be noted that the greatest number of multiple-office holders 
in the past 20 years from Atlantic County are not actually from Atlantic City, 
although a good number of them are. A logistical issue in the organization of the 
data exacerbates the influence of each individual multiple-office holder. To 
organize the information regarding multiple-office holding per county, I collected 
the names of every multiple-office holder in every district for twenty years, using 
the definition of multiple-office holding delineated previously. Since every 
legislature, just like the US Congress, has its own number and is considered a 
separate entry every year, I considered it appropriate to repeat names. So one 
multiple-office holder can multiply at most 20 times (one for each year studied).  
  While District 9 does have some multiple-office holders, the reason it 
appears particularly so is because of one individual, former State Senator Leonard 
Connors. Connors, which has served for more than 30 years as the mayor of Surf 
City, NJ, and agreed to speak with us on his 20+ year tenure in both that position 
and the state senate, was in the state senate for the duration of the time frame with 
which we are working with the exception of the year 2008, when he stepped down   80 
from his legislative seat in order to wind down and focus on being mayor. Thus it 
appears that Connors counts for 18 different multiple-office holders, which 
counterbalance those individuals in the rough Northeastern politics that are lucky 
to last more than their two-year term without a corruption scandal. Thus it appears 
that the tiny Surf City is one of the major focal points for multiple-office holding 
which, despite it being only one person elected, the fact that Connors was able to 
maintain himself in that position for 18 years and not rile up any significant 
contenders does make a strong case for the area being in support of public 
officials that hold more than one office. 
  As discussed in the past several pages, despite the claims by many that 
multiple-office holding is an issue that affects everyone in the state and is a native 
flaw of New Jersey as a whole, studying the background of most of the recent 
leaders that hold more than one office demonstrates that most of the state, at least 
geographically, has little problem with the matter. Moreover, taking a look at the 
social composition of their geographic backgrounds proves that the issue stretches 
beyond certain areas rising up but, rather, that urban areas seem to have a more 
favorable disposition towards multiple-office holding as a whole. 
  As we will see in the next chapter, the individuals that are voted into 
office from areas which are safe havens for multiple-office holding tend to also 
approach legislative issues in different ways from those that are elected from 
areas more politically conventional compared to the rest of the nation. This is 
especially true when the legislation in discussion pertains specifically to multiple-
office holding itself. It is easy to vote against multiple-office holding as a   81 
representative from Hunterdon or Cumberland Counties, where the issue has little 
to no affect on citizens but voting to abolish it certainly looks good on a resume. 
To vote against it as a Hudson County politician with five jobs is a much different 
story. Corzine, a native Chicagoan, also has little experience in areas where 
multiple-office holding is the norm, and has the background necessary to perhaps 
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CHAPTER 5: The Legislature Goes to War 
  In Chapter 3, it was previously discussed that the atmosphere in 2007 was 
ripe for a multiple-office holding ban because of several factions in the state 
government at play: Jon Corzine and his desire and mandate to undo most of the 
damage incurred from the McGreevey administration, a strong Republican lobby 
lead by State Senator Tom Kean, Jr. opposing the multiple-office holding practice 
because of “ethical” reasons, and a minority of multiple-office holders that were 
retiring from at least one position, mostly due to retirement age in itself but 
exploited by the press as acts of selflessness before the people. Studying multiple-
office holding in this manner, however, excludes a major factor from being in 
play here: the fact that New Jersey is politically fragmented in such a way that 
different parts of the state are more or less accepting of multiple-office holding, 
and these trends have persisted over a significant amount of time.  
  As discussed in the previous chapter, New Jersey is not at all politically 
homogenous, especially within the context of multiple-office holding. In fact, 
most areas in New Jersey are not particularly favorable to the practice, especially 
the larger and less populous counties. Most of the multiple-office holding going in 
on New Jersey is concentrated into urban areas: the Hudson-Bergen-Essex urban 
triumvirate, some areas by Camden and Trenton, Passaic, and Atlantic Counties. 
However, this is where most New Jerseyans reside. If it is true that attitudes 
towards multiple-office holding as expressed through elections vary across the 
state, it should also follow that we are to expect these patterns to be reflected in 
the representatives these people elect to higher offices. Thus, the arguments in   83 
Chapter 4 that the reason for the multiple-office holding ban passing in 2007-2008 
and not before is incomplete without taking into consideration the regional 
attitudes at play in the construction of this law. Of course the statewide factors: 
the Corzine/McGreevey rivalry, the Republican desire to constrict Democratic 
power in a solidly blue state, etc., are extremely salient in comprehending what 
went on in the New Jersey Legislature at the time. However, this is only one part 
of the story. To explain the behaviors of many of these representatives that were 
either in support or opposition to the practice, it is imperative to look at their 
regional background. 
  The political atmosphere surrounding the May 2007 ban was not a 
particularly clean or honest one, so as to create a domino ethics reform effect 
against multiple-office holding despite its rapid increase in popularity. It is true 
that some multiple-office holders at the time were facing significant trouble; 
however, the overall influence against the practice pushed to the contrary. The 
legislature only began to face significant outside pressure to reform later that year. 
In July 2007, US Attorney for the state of New Jersey Christopher Christie went 
on an arresting spree, taking what he called in the New York Times a “corruption 
tour” that ended with several arrests and indictments, including that of Newark 
Mayor and state senator Sharpe James (Feuer 2007, Chen 2007). If there had been 
pressure from the Eliot Spitzer-esque federal attorney towards reform since his 
appointment in 2001, it could only be interpreted as a self-aggrandizing ploy, like 
most things in this state. Christie announced in December 2008 that he could be 
interested in running for governor of the state after years of speculation   84 
(Reitmeyer 2009). Certainly the influence of such an overtly ambitious political 
character would not be enough to push the law. Even if Christie, with the aid of 
current governor Jon Corzine’s push for reform, were to convince a significant 
amount of lawmakers to push for change, loopholes in the law to ensure that the 
legislature is more representative of a larger and diverse group of people, without 
any regard for the informal machine structures that thrive on a practice, simply do 
not compute. 
  In this chapter I propose to highlight that dimension of the multiple-office 
holding ban that erupted from regional trends in the matter—that is to say, the 
factors regarding regional attitudes towards multiple-office holding that lead to 
the necessary amount of legislators that would make it possible to pass this law. I 
will give a detailed account of what was going on in New Jersey at the time, 
beginning with the state senator elections in the 33
rd District (Hudson County) as 
my main case study examining the state of multiple-office holders as a group at 
the time. I will argue that, while in places like Hudson County, multiple-office 
holding was widely accepted, and McGreevey’s influence did help, him being 
from Middlesex County and all, Corzine’s influence coupled with the strength of 
the Republican Central Jersey lobby made it possible to pass a law in which the 
only thing that multiple-office holders could do was join the movement in order to 
save themselves in order to sacrifice others, which is why Newark mayor Sharpe 
James also sponsored this law. These factors accumulated against multiple-office 
holding because, in itself, the practice strongly benefits those who adhere to it, but 
it is usually at the expense of neighboring cities that lack the strength of double   85 
representation. Looking at the after-effects of the 2007 33
rd District state senate 
elections, for example, it is clear that there are many instances where places 
represented by candidates that are unable to win elections for more than one 
office are forced into a subsidiary position to the mayoral seat of the person in 
legislative power.  
  Additionally, it is necessary to look at individual cases of multiple-office 
holding that can clarify the intentions and attitudes of legislators from within. On 
paper, finding a common denominator among the multiple-office holders may not 
always be the simplest task to complete. However, as a collection of public 
servants with one specific preference in governing, they do seem to enjoy similar 
habitats. Despite the fact that their populations are higher and thus they should 
have more politicians among them to accommodate, urban politicians—
particularly those in the three urban sectors of the northeast and the outskirts of 
Trenton—tend to prefer holding more than one job. A significant factor 
contributing to this could be the fact that, despite the higher gross number of 
individuals, more are living below the poverty line (3% above the national 
average in Hudson County, 2% in Essex). Moreover, a dividing factor between 
these regions and others in New Jersey where the rate of multiple-office holders is 
low along with family or individual income is the percentage of foreign-born or 
non-citizen residents. Hudson, Essex, Bergen, and Passaic counties all have at 
least twice the national average of foreign-born citizens, with an average of 42% 
of households in the four counties speaking a language other than English at home 
(Hudson County tops this list with 56% of families being multilingual). In terms   86 
of citizenship status, this translates into an average of 50% of residents in the four 
counties not being US citizens, and thus neither being able to vote nor run for 
office. The narrowing of the possible public servant pool could very well be a 
contributing factor to the number of individuals in these areas who are willing to 
take up several jobs, machine politics aside.
17 
  While these macro-factors are quite useful in understanding the 
mechanisms that drive this practice as a localized trend, it answers little questions 
as to the fiber that makes up individuals willing to engage several jobs 
simultaneously.  Additionally, given the make-up of both chambers of the 
legislature and the enormous pressure on the legislature from Governor Jon 
Corzine in 2007 to pass the ban on the practice, many multiple-office holders did 
vote in favor of the ban, including a decent amount from the usually suspect areas. 
Governor Corzine, who himself was polite enough to the state to give up his 
senate seat before taking the highest executive office in New Jersey, blackmailed 
legislators by refusing to sign property tax relief bills in 2007 unless a majority of 
the legislature voted in favor of the multiple-office holding ban, which polls by 
the Bergen Record show about 80% of citizens being in favor of (“Hold that Pen” 
2007). For State Senators that may not have an interest in maintaining a machine 
with public officers serving in various positions, the choice to ban the practice 
may be sensible. It definitely puts the legislator in a positive anti-corruption light 
for a short term before everyone forgets that it was even possible to hold more 
than one elected office. However, given the chance to defend their positions, it is 
                                                 
17 All the aforementioned statistics courtesy of the US Census Factfinder, and are 
compiled from the 2005-2007 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates.   87 
worth investigating what individuals who hold multiple offices have to say for 
themselves and what positive outcomes they can cite from having more than one 
position. 
The Multiple-Office Holding Kings of Hudson County 
  Union City, NJ, the introductory case in this study, is arguably the most 
multiple-office holder friendly city in the state. Following the trends recording in 
Chapter 5, it makes sense that the most densely populated city in America 
(52,977.8 individuals per square mile according to the 2000 US Census) would 
also be the home of 5 distinct legislative multiple-office holders in the past 20 
years as per the NJ Legislative Manuals—that is to say, a constant stream of 
multiple-office holders elected to the New Jersey Legislature for 20 years, rather 
than one stand-out individual taking two jobs for that amount of time. It also 
makes sense that this would be the home of longer-reigning and more powerful 
multiple-office holders, such as former mayor Robert Menendez, who serves in 
two offices for six years and is now the most powerful Latino in the US Senate 
and arguably in the nation.  
  I begin the study of the 2007 political climate here because this is the 
strongest base for this kind of activity, and in order for the system to crumble it 
follows that the foundations must have been somewhat weaker. Yet Union City in 
2007 appeared perfectly comfortable with its multiple-office holding captain, 
Mayor and State Assemblyman Brian P. Stack. Stack’s history with the city has 
brought him into such a comfortable position with voters that there was a time, in 
2003, where he held three jobs: mayor, state assemblyman, and freeholder for the   88 
county (“Hudson County” 2003). Beginning his career at 17, Stack made a name 
for himself in the late 1980s and early 1990s doing community service and 
working in local activism. In Union City, much like in the Jersey City of Frank 
Hague or the New York of Boss Tweed, “advocacy” and “community service” 
mostly translates to one thing: turkeys. The distribution of free turkeys for 
Christmas and Thanksgiving were major issues in the New York and New Jersey 
traditionally considered machine-ridden, and it was with turkeys and toys that 
Stack made a name for himself. A Hudson Reporter profile of the mayor from 
2005 states with pride that Stack’s civic association gives away an average of 
12,000 turkeys and 15,000 toys a year (Amato 2005).  
  Stack also made a name for himself for his uncanny ability to be warm and 
personal with anyone he met, a necessary trait for a politician. Silvio Acosta, a 
subordinate campaign manager for Stack’s unsuccessful mayoral run in 1998 and 
Cuban exile activist in the county who gave the researcher some anecdotes on 
local politics is fond of telling a story of an Indian-American voter who 
passionately supported Stack. “We were canvassing door-to-door for Brian,” he 
explained in Spanish, “and when the man opens the door and we say the name 
‘Brian Stack,’ the man tells us: ‘Brian Stack is the only person in my entire life 
who has ever sent me a card on my birthday. He is the only person that cares, and 
I will never fail to vote for him.” 
  These kind of personal relationships are, of course, straight out of the 
traditional machine playbook. In describing the Democratic machine as it has 
manifested itself throughout most of American political history, Frank Robinson   89 
states in his study Machine Politics: “[the machine] would pay a bill for you if 
you were strapped for cash, deliver coal and food, Christmas and Thanksgiving 
turkeys… the neighborhood politician knew you personally by name, and greeted 
you enthusiastically as a friend. He often seemed the only man in the great 
impersonal metropolis genuinely concerned about you and your welfare” 
(Robinson 1976, 3). This is precisely the attitude that Stack employed in his 1998 
elections, which he lost against state legislator Raul “Rudy Garcia and the 
Alliance machine lead by then-Congressman Bob Menendez (Edge 2009) and 
what got him to the top position after a bitter recall election after which Garcia 
was deemed unfit to govern. 
  Union City’s closest (culturally and geographically) neighbor, West New 
York, had a slightly different breed of political climate in 2007. After being under 
the administration of now US Congressman Albio Sires from 1995 to 2006, the 
city required a new crop of politicians to come up and rearrange themselves so as 
to fix the mess that Jon Corzine’s staff reorganizing began. Sires was appointed to 
replace Robert Menendez in the US House of Representatives after Menendez 
moved up to the Senate to replace Corzine, leaving a void in the top office of 
West New York. Chosen to replace Sires as mayor was Commissioner Silverio 
(“Sal”) Vega. As a commissioner, Vega had already began his political career as 
multiple-office holder, employed as the longest-serving chairman of the Hudson 
County Board of Chosen Freeholders and also working with the Hudson County 
Schools of Technology board of education and as a state assemblyman. Unlike 
Stack, however, Vega did not begin his career with politics on his mind, nor did   90 
he have time to develop a real individual political personality. Having emigrated 
from the small town of Cárdenas, Cuba as a child, Vega had the predictable 
hurdles of immigration to overcome before even thinking of having a political 
career. Vega’s early life is marked by his education—a Bachelor of Science from 
the University of Tennessee in physical education. He was a track star and a 
teacher, a far cry from the lifelong politicians surrounding him. However, despite 
his higher education compared to Stack, the latter holds a key check against him: 
all the years Vega was out of state, Stack was walking the streets as a civil 
activist, making a name for himself. What’s more, when assuming the position of 
mayor, Vega had not yet proven that he was capable of a political victory on his 
own. While the experience from the aforementioned jobs made him a trustworthy 
candidate, all his victories, including the mayor’s seat that he did not win in an 
election, were a product of his affiliation with a machine and not with the people. 
He entered the mayor’s office with almost no mandate from the people, leaving 
him in a vulnerable but definitely fixable position. 
The 2007 State Senate Election Heats Up 
  The year 2007 began with wide speculation on the future of Brian Stack’s 
career. Given his ascent against a powerful machine and establishment as a 
formidable political force in and of himself, the campaign for the next powerful 
office on the ladder seemed set: Stack would run against incumbent Bernard 
Kenny for the state senate seat. Kenny, however, sensing this danger, stepped 
down and opened the way for Stack rather than being demolished by standing in 
his way (Edge 2007). Kenny himself was never an overwhelmingly popular   91 
political figure—West New York political fixture Silvio Acosta once wrote an 
article on the state senator in local newsletter The Political Reporter called “The 
Incognito Senator,” a basic narrative describing the process Acosta went through 
in the search for Kenny’s state senate office. He could never find any contact 
information, nor anyone in the three most popular coffee stops in the city that 
knew who Kenny was. 
  Given the near-complete lack of Republican opposition in the region, this 
meant that Stack was practically guaranteed the senate seat in the upcoming 
elections. There was no real open opposition to Stack running among the 
Democrats either, and first and foremost among his supporters in January of that 
year was Sal Vega, who gave a speech in his behalf (the raw footage is not 
available, but the Stack campaign later used it in an attack ad (“Believe” 2007)). 
  It did not take long before Vega decided that peace was not the best 
alternative to the situation. As early as February 7
th, reports began to surface of 
conflict between Vega and his predecessor Albio Sires as Vega chose to fire 
several key members of the Sires administration and replace them with loyalists 
of Anthony DeFino: Sires once-great political nemesis. Vega also began to turn 
on his peers in the State Assembly in a manner that one assemblyman described 
as “shooting his mouth off”. While he was still allied with Stack at this time, it 
took little for Vega to take the complete plunge (“Menendez v. Garcia” 2007). 
Vega launched his campaign on April 4
th, 2007 in one of the most surreal political 
turnarounds in mainstream political history—but probably one of the more 
average ones for Hudson County (“Vega Itching” 2007). Citing rumors   92 
circulating that Stack was vaguely corrupt and some arrests made on government 
employees in Union City, Vega set off in his dinky Freedom Wagon across Union 
City itself attempting convert people to his cause. While Politicker NJ later 
described the Freedom Wagon (think the John McCain campaign bus meets Ron 
Paul blimp) as a “luxurious, gas-guzzling RV [that] gives Vega the appearance of 
a bewildered mid-western tourist in search of the Turnpike on the back-roads of 
Union City,” (“Vega Profile” 2007), Vega managed to pique the interest of main 
Hudson County machine the Hudson County Democratic Organization which, 
looking to put a stop to Stack’s increasing stranglehold in the region, decided to 
support Vega. Stack, on the other hand, put together a makeshift organization of 
his own, Democrats for Hudson County, which functioned nearly exclusively as a 
banner with which to get the team names on the ballot. At the height of the 
multiple-office holding frenzy and just as the bill to ban the practice was being 
written by the state legislature, these two mayors put all on the line for a precious 
second (in Vega’s case, third) job.  
  Stack’s campaign began in classic Stack style. Putting the Brian P. Stack 
Civic Association into overdrive to help any- and everyone in need, Stack 
maintained a mostly positive image in the face of a barrage of negative attacks. 
Among the stronger points Stack emphasized was funding for a new high school 
in Union City and further funding for public housing. In other words, Brian Stack 
made clear that he was a master of bringing home the bacon. On the other hand, 
Vega made the fatal error of making the entire campaign about Brian Stack. 
Websites with clearly smearing names like StackScandal.com (now a private   93 
blog) complimented the vicious attacks from the HCDO camp accusing Stack’s 
administration of embezzling money and creating government jobs as favors to 
loyal benefactors (“Shocking News” 2007). Stack retaliated with “Believe,” 
which exploited the speech Vega gave in his favor the January before. As the jabs 
intensified, Vega, under pressure from various Cuban-American groups in favor 
of Stack, thus made perhaps the biggest mistake of his career. 
  Union City, West New York, Guttenberg, and North Bergen share one of 
the largest commercial avenues in Hudson County: Bergenline Avenue, home to a 
colorful collection of ethnic stores, restaurants and similar establishments. As 
both Union City and West New York share the second-largest Cuban-American 
population in America outside of Miami, one of the biggest events of the year is 
the Cuban Independence Day Parade that travels up Bergenline Ave. At the height 
of Parade fever, Vega, a Cuban-American himself, refused to give the 
organization in charge of the parade a permit for entering West New York, the 
largest and most significant piece of parade real estate. The reasoning is best 
summarized by Jonathan Miller’s evaluation in the New York Times: according to 
Vega, “over the years the parade had lost sight of the suffering in Cuba, and he 
wanted nothing to do with such a spectacle. ‘The truth is, no one is talking about 
the plight of the Cuban people,’ Mr. Vega said in a news conference on Monday” 
(Miller). In other words, celebrating Cuban Independence Day was a slap in the 
face to the millions on the island that suffer from a rigid totalitarian regime. To 
Vega loyalists, many of which overlap with the portion of the West New York 
population that is still rabidly anti-Castro, the message of solidarity rang true.   94 
However, for many others, especially those involved with the parade on a long-
term basis, the ban was perceived as racist and disrespectful to one of the most 
significant ethnic communities in the district. Moreover, the fact that there was a 
heated election in the midst of this stunt did not go unnoticed by most voters. The 
leaders of the parade, noted allies of the Stack campaign, were noticeably 
dismayed and came to a predictably political conclusion. According to the NYT 
piece, founder and chief executive of the Cuban Day Parade Emilio del Valle had 
no doubt in his mind that the prohibition of the parade was an attempt to silence 
the voice of his opposition’s support. “’He doesn’t want to walk next to the mayor 
of Union City through his own town… because he knows he will be booed and 
his opponent will be cheered. He has converted this to a political issue, and he 
won’t admit that’” (Miller 23 May 2007). This point of view was further 
corroborated by Vega’s past attitude towards the parade. This was the first year 
that Vega appeared so passionately against communism (as represented by the 
parade). In fact, many opponents of Vega’s crackdown on the festivities turned to 
photographic evidence of Vega supporting and enjoying himself at the parade in 
previous years.
18 
  If the intention behind blocking the parade was to quiet down the Stack 
supporters and garner the support of the Cuban-American community in the area, 
the plan could not have backfired more. About a week before the election, a New 
Jersey Supreme Court judge ruled against Vega’s ban on the parade, which would 
have cut three of the four cities involved in it from the event
 (Miller 31 May 
                                                 
18 See Appendix C for image of Stack, Vega and Congressman Albio Sires (then 
West New York Mayor) at the 2005 Cuban Day Parade.   95 
2007). Vega respected the decision of the court, but ordered the West New York 
section of Bergenline Avenue to be decorated in black ribbons to honor those 
suffering on the island.  
  The voters did not understand or appreciate the gesture. The parade 
incident became the deathblow to the already fledgling Vega campaign. The final 
vote tally put Stack 44% ahead of Vega’s tally, winning 77% of the vote in the 
district and winning Vega’s hometown (Friedman 2007). While the meaning of 
this in terms of the cities themselves is up for debate, in this story is certainly 
highlighted a certain appreciation for multiple-office holding that only this region 
of New Jersey could provide, and quite a compelling reason for many that oppose 
multiple-office holding for the government interfering in these affairs. Since the 
voters had a choice between two multiple-office holders, evaluating their attitude 
in general towards the practice is somewhat more difficult. State Senator Stack, 
while holding two jobs proudly, is not exactly a vocal activist for multiple-office 
holding. Upon attempting to contact him, we were unable to schedule an 
interview, and records demonstrate that Stack is not incredibly vocal in defending 
the practice (he abstained from voting for or against the ban while an 
Assemblyman). Vega, however, has gone out of his way to defend his three jobs. 
According to PolitickerNJ (by far the most concise and trustworthy source of 
recent New Jersey political information), when asked about his three jobs (now 
two since he has evacuated the Assembly), Vega answered "My father worker in a 
factory, a restaurant, and sold jewelry on the side. He was a triple dipper, too. 
That’s where I learned it." (“Sal Vega” 2007).    96 
  The Hudson County story is significant because it highlights the 
fragmentation of the core group supporting multiple-office holding at the time. If 
they start fighting among themselves, there will be less of them elected to higher 
offices to defend the practice. Yet it is also important to highlight the people still 
left around to vote against the ban and the places from which they come. In the 
next segment I propose to study two multiple-office holders from very different 
places and their relationship with the legislature, the municipal government, and 
each other. 
Sacco and Connors: Multiple-Office Holding on Both Sides of the Spectrum 
  Nicholas Sacco has always attempted to push the envelope. Beginning his 
career in education, at his peak multiple-office holding activity, Sacco was the 
mayor of North Bergen, NJ, the 32
nd District’s state senator, an Assistant 
Superintendent of Schools in the City, and an elementary school principal. He has 
also always held ties to county government and worked closely with the Hudson 
County Democratic Organization. Once again, this is exemplary of Hudson 
County politics in particular, though North Bergen is more socioeconomically 
akin to southern portions of Bergen County. 
  Coming from this sort of a world, it’s no surprise that Sacco’s first 
comment on the Corzine corruption spree that helped passed the ban on multiple-
office holding would be “I wonder what planet he’s from” when agreeing to 
answer some of our questions via telephone from his office in North Bergen 
Town Hall. Sacco expressed what appeared to be genuine bewilderment that such 
a law would pass. “The legislature can run wild with some very high ideals,” he   97 
answered when asked how he believed such a law could pass when multiple-
office holders abounded as they did. “Legislators are much more removed from 
the people. People don’t know what they do, but everyone knows what the mayor 
is doing.” The level of accountability of a mayor, he argues, is significantly higher 
than that of legislator because of the nature of an executive office. Other 
legislators, such as the aforementioned wild card from South Jersey Leonard 
Connors
19 (R-Surf City) agree, particularly in the latter’s case because Surf City is 
a much tinier town than North Bergen. Surf City is a coastal town on Long Beach 
Island, a thin strip of land that garnishes the hip of New Jersey. It’s population is 
barely existent and its main political issues, as explained by Connors, tended 
towards the fishing, crabbing, and clamming industries and what to do with the 
city in winter
20. 
  In a place like Surf City, Connors argues, everyone knows each other, 
especially as visible a personality as the chief executive, and so the responsibility 
deepens to a much more personal level than it would be otherwise. While Sacco 
admits that in such a populated place as North Bergen, the level at which this 
occurs is less so, he states that he still feels a pressure that is foreign to legislators 
because of the size of their constituency and the little visibility their 
responsibilities get in the media and in residents’ daily lives. 
                                                 
19 Connors’ biographical information, rather than being placed directly after the 
longer Sacco information, I hope to place in an earlier chapter where I talk about 
the history of multiple-office holding in general, rather than in recent memory. 
20 Surf City was the setting of the beginning of German director Wim Wenders’ 
film Alice in die Städten (Alice in the Cities).    98 
  What does that heightened responsibility translate to? A more active 
public servant, argue both mayors despite their party identification. For Sacco, he 
viewed holding two offices as a personal mission to regain for his city and his 
county—Hudson often being the corruption laughingstock of the state—the 
respect he felt it deserved. As a mayor, he often felt slighted by the legislators in 
charge of his district when demanding what his residents needed, knowledge he 
would otherwise not have had with the executive position. “[In 1994] we were 
receiving no respect county-wide as a city, and I went to the state senator saying I 
had someone [to appoint as a judge], and he had to listen to a mayor of a city of 
15,000.” His suggestion was completely ignored. Meanwhile, the legislator in 
question had voted in favor of a seemingly innocuous bill allocating funding to 
residences for drug-addicted citizens who needed a place to stay. “What happened 
in North Bergen,” he explained in his rendition of the crisp, fragmented, fast-
paced vernacular typical of the area, “there was an intense fight on 70-something 
Street
21, one of the most expensive areas, for the mentally ill drug addicts. The 
people in that neighborhood absolutely erupted.” Area residents, concerned about 
crime and property value, were outraged that the state legislator didn’t take into 
consideration the area in which the residences for these individuals was to be 
built. According to Sacco, when approaching the state legislator, “this person had 
                                                 
21 North Bergen is culturally divided into two sub-sections: uptown and 
downtown. Uptown is considered wealthier and more residential with higher 
populations of non-Hispanic whites. Downtown is more commercialized, urban, 
poor, and Hispanic. Both areas are divided by the presence of a large chunk of 
Union City in between them. “Downtown” spans the area between 1
st and 20
th 
Streets; “Uptown” begins around 70
th Street and ends on the Bergen County line. 
This information derived from visits to North Bergen, personal observation, and 
interviews with residents.   99 
voted for the bill and didn’t want to hear about it.” Being removed from the city 
and stuck in Trenton, Sacco argues, rendered the state legislator useless to the 
citizens of his district. This made him believe in the power of multiple-office 
holding and convinced him to run. 
  While the specific issues that plague urban centers like North Bergen do 
seem to lend themselves to multiple-office holding better, thus making the areas 
fertile ground for the practice, Connors agrees that his experience as mayor 
helped him serve in the legislature. “Most of the time it helped me to be mayor 
and understand local government… many of these legislators don’t understand the 
problems local officials go through with budgeting, etc.” As similar an example 
given the vastly different areas that Sacco and Connors reign over from the 
coastal area involved protection of the environment. Just as the legislature voted 
for something that sounded on paper to be in good faith to help drug-addicted 
residents in North Bergen, the Environmental Protection Agency entered some 
coastal areas and confiscated land. In Little Egg Harbor Township, an area almost 
20 miles south of Surf City with very similar demographics, government, 
resources, and culture, the government confiscated a man’s land, about 20 acres 
of it, in the name of environmental protection. “They didn’t let him build a home 
on his land,” Connors explained, “because the EPA had designated the land to be 
protected area of the Pinelands
22.” Not listening to or understanding the territorial 
boundaries and demands of citizens is one of the key faults, argue both mayors, of 
                                                 
22 “The Pinelands National Reserve includes portions of seven southern New 
Jersey counties, and encompasses over one-million acres of farms, forests and 
wetlands. It contains 56 communities, from hamlets to suburbs, with over 700,000 
permanent residents.” (National Park Service, US Dept. of Interior 2009).   100 
single-office legislators who have no real knowledge of the happenings on the 
ground in their district. 
  Where there are more people competing to own more pieces of land, and 
where the government often tries to enact laws regarding land that will affect 
more people living on it, it would logically follow that there would be a higher 
demand for a more personable, approachable legislator, someone who knows the 
ins and outs of the area better than anyone else—someone who has an office that 
will give them all the information they need to legislate. The way in which Sacco 
and Connors, among others, describe some of the individual benefits to districts 
that have multiple-office holders certainly fits into the geographic composition of 
the state based on these offices. They do not, however, lend much information 
regarding the reasoning behind Corzine and legislators like Senator Tom Kean 
and others, mostly Republicans that consider the position of having two offices a 
conflict of interest that is severely detrimental to the state. Sure, there is 
something to be said about being the neighboring town of a city with a mayor as 
well as a state senator.  
  Perhaps the most poignant example of what a neighboring town could 
suffer in the hands of a state legislator who is the chief executive of another town 
is also in Hudson County. The increasingly acrimonious relationship between 
West New York’s Sal Vega and the district’s state senator and Union City Mayor 
Brian P. Stack, as chronicled previously, seems to finally be taking a significant 
toll on the town. While Vega and Stack announced a truce several months after 
they both ran for the state senate seat after Vega had endorsed Stack the January   101 
before the primary election (Friedman Dec 2007), the situation in West New York 
has not seen any significant improvement. Violence in schools has risen while 
funding for roads and social programs is on a decline, and the city’s financial 
situation is in dire straits, with several tax increases, a several-billion-dollar 
deficit that did not exist prior to Vega’s inauguration, and several hearings on the 
budget proving fruitless (Staab 2009). Meanwhile, Union City has almost 
completed construction on a new high school and the Hudson Reporter is replete 
with letters of praise for the mayor. It is a valid argument that the state of affairs 
in West New York has much to do with the state senator not allocating the city 
funds as payback to Vega for betraying him (Vega, who was on the ballot as the 
candidate for the Hudson County Democratic Organization team, also represented 
the mainstream Democratic “machine” of which Sacco is a major leader). Others 
will argue that outside influences, such as the recent lawsuit filed by West New 
York’s Chief Financial Officer Darren Mahoney against Mayor Vega for sexual 
harassment, have distracted significantly from the mayor’s ability to govern 
(“WNY Official Files Sex Suit” 2009).  
  Unfortunately, I spoke to Mayor Sacco several weeks before Vega was 
charged with the harassment suit and thus was unable to ask about the issue, 
although in attempts to discuss the matter with Sacco he opted to return to 
discussing his experience in the state senate (the researcher suspects the change in 
subject has much to do with Vega’s and Sacco’s positions in the HCDO, which, to 
reiterate Sacco’s objections, is “not a machine”. It is left up to the reader to decide 
how trustworthy this assertion is). In discussing how he decided to run for the   102 
state senate because of the fact that North Bergen “didn’t get any respect” in the 
county, however, he did state that this lack of respect could possibly be at the 
benefit of other cities around him. At the time he ran, US Senator Robert 
Menendez (D-NJ) was serving in a nearby senate seat as Union City mayor, and 
the mayors of Bayonne and West New York were also involved in legislative 
state politics. “I knew what the problem was,” he explained, when his town was 
not reaping the benefits of being represented on a state level that it deserved. “I 
had a fight to pass through legislation to help North Bergen instead of other cities 
that were similar.” He cited specifically Union City and Bayonne as the main 
adversaries, despite the fact that neither of these were in the same district, but to a 
representative like, say, Leonard Connors, it is easy to neglect distinguishing 
between most of the cities in the northeast, apart from places like Jersey City and 
Newark.  
  Thus we can see that the lobby and arguments in favor of multiple-office 
holding are often strong, but that geographically and politically 2007 was an 
unstable time for multiple-office holders. The strength of the arguments made by 
individuals like Sacco or Connors was undermined by the bloody political warfare 
going on between other multiple-office holders in the area. For hard-line GOPers 
desperately looking for anything to make their play and weaken the northern 
Democrats significantly, the activity of which the Vega/Stack fight was 
exemplary is heaven-sent and, when combined with evidence of corruption from 
the McGreevey era and the backing of a Democratic governor in this effort, and 
the deviation of characters like Sharpe James in order to save their own jobs, the   103 
motives and organization with which multiple-office holding was banned 
becomes significantly more vivid. Not only is the competition among multiple-
office holders a dangerous issue in general, but among those of the same district, 
especially if that region is stigmatized as one where multiple-office holding is 
rampant, it lends credibility to the right-wing (and Corzine) argument that 
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CHAPTER 6: The Democratic Upsides of Dual Office Holding 
  For many scholars that have spent their careers attempting to chart and 
comprehend trends in the macro-structure of human political interaction, the 
previous information could perhaps have been extremely daunting. It appears that 
a great number of individuals in academia spend their lives studying large-scale 
national politics or interactions among nations; to see that municipal politics and 
interactions among towns and cities presents a similar if not more difficult puzzle 
may weaken the nerve of some exploring these types of studies. However, the 
progress in a field that many take for granted as simple should not have such an 
effect on the entire community. There is little reason to feel daunted by the 
expansive nature of local politics. Part of the apprehension may come from the 
fact that local politics, since it is not by its nature uniform, is a mostly unknown 
phenomenon. Especially in New Jersey, where scholars are faced with strange 
configurations such as Boards of Chosen Freeholders and Commissioner boards 
and governments that appear nowhere else in the world, it may seem best to 
ignore the matter and move on to issues which may be simpler to grasp given 
what is mostly considered universal knowledge of American politics. Often, and 
especially in the beginning of the assembly of this study where so few precedents 
had been set in the study of multiple-office holding, it appeared as if the macro-
political world was the only significant one, and yet as soon as a political scientist 
paid attention to the micro-political in ways beyond anthropology and the vague 
attempts at defining “social capital” that pervade academia the entire system 
flickered under the new pressure. Of course, the main reason for the pervasiveness 
in American political studies of national issues is that most scholars would   105 
consider national trends and the study of federal government more relevant to 
more people in the nation. Everyone, the belief goes, is affected by the federal 
government’s actions. Going into a forgotten region of the United States and 
examining how politicians act when Big Brother turns his back can seem 
inherently more difficult and more useless. However, a major theme that this 
study ventures to convey is that individuals are more affected by their local 
governments than the federal one. The fact that most people are affected in similar 
ways by the federal government does not erase the fact that local politics, 
especially in areas that are multiple-office holder friendly, is a much more 
powerful influence in their daily lives. It is the mayor that hands out free turkeys 
on Thanksgiving, gives away free government housing, or files their taxes. It is 
the state that gives funding for paving the roads they take to work every day and 
maintain the schools in which their children learn. However, the decentralization 
makes finding patterns infinitely more difficult, and beyond that, useless in 
studying the impact of these governments. All we can do as scholars, just as we 
do with large nations, is make comparative studies. Engaging with the topic of 
multiple-office holding in one of the most unique political climates in the nation, 
then, does appear to be self-indulgent in a way that will benefit few people, as a 
small number of the people living in America can relate to New Jersey politics 
and the very specific niche multiple-office holders inhabit. Self-indulgent, 
perhaps, but studying these trends is infinitely useful in terms of understanding 
how to make other local governments better. By examining the traits of a specific 
political climate molded by decades of eccentric government structures,   106 
immigration, and hyper-population density, scholars can find the positive traits of 
the smaller case and attempt to mold other governments such that these benefits 
arise.  The reverse with the negative aspects of New Jersey’s political situation is 
also true.  
  I have decided to dedicate the final pages of this work to a more value-
based evaluation of multiple-office holding itself. The main goal of this work was 
to explore the reasons this practice arose in New Jersey and especially the reasons 
for the state government opposing and finally partially banning it in 2007, when 
we later learned the practice was increasingly popular. Nowhere previously have I 
intended to defend or condemn the practice. After a quick recapitulation of the 
results of my study, however, I intend to give myself the freedom to express some 
conclusions I have arrived at with regard to the benefits and detriments of the 
practice. Multiple-office holding can be an extremely positive force in legislatures 
especially (though in other government realms, too) because it increases 
accountability by increasing and empowering the constituency as well as giving 
individuals that are more closely acquainted with the needs of their constituencies 
a say in state government. Mayors are especially well equipped to understand the 
demands of the constituency, and to give them a voice in the state government 
gives someone very closely linked to the needs of the community the tools they 
need to draft legislation and pass laws that the community which they serve very 
much needs. To elaborate on my points more specifically, I will argue against the 
points made by Tom O’Neill in his work One to a Customer: The Democratic 
Downsides of Dual Office Holding. O’Neill’s work is the premier piece of   107 
literature on multiple-office holding in New Jersey and quite possibly the only 
academic study on the matter out there previous to this piece. In One to a 
Customer, O’Neill dedicates his chapters to eight main detriments of having a 
multiple-office holder in control of his jobs. Each one of these shall be debunked 
herein. 
Corzine, McGreevey, and Urbanization in Multiple-Office Holding 
  To reiterate, this piece has asked two main questions of the current 
political situation in New Jersey: what kind of political environment creates 
acceptance among individuals of public servants that work more than one job, and 
what setting did the New Jersey Legislature find itself in during the 2007 ban on 
the practice? The latter question has a much easier answer than the former. After a 
disastrous tenure in the governor’s mansion by a well-known multiple-office 
holder who supported a network of equally- employed public servants, the 
legislature was ready to reclaim what little positive reputation they could find in 
the state. At the very least, this is the cleanest answer. The McGreevey 
administration was a failure for many reasons beyond the Golan Cipel fiasco; 
taxes skyrocketed, the state’s education systems faltered, and the governor was 
often found anywhere but his Trenton office. However, it was the unimaginable 
number of enemies that McGreevey made while in office that did him in. 
Evidence from The Soprano State and state news at the time (c. 2005) point out 
that McGreevey had many these enemies through all sorts of decisions, including 
but not limited to $105,000 taxpayer-funded “trade mission” voyages to Ireland 
(in reality family reunions- Ingle 48), his association with known political fiend   108 
Chuck Schumer, and his appointment of famous poet (“If there was poetry… we 
can’t find [it]”: Ingle 60) Golan Cipel. Among those enemies, of course, Senator 
Jon Corzine, who later took over after McGreevey completed his own demise. In 
the Corzine/McGreevey power struggle that ensued it became increasingly clear 
that the suspicions held in the hypothesis of this work and corroborated by State 
Senator Nicholas Sacco et al were true. McGreevey took care of his own, and 
many multiple-office holders in the legislature had unabashedly supported him. 
Multiple-office holders, as Sen. Sacco explained to us in Chapter 5, tend to form 
political bonds with each other because they have similar understandings of 
municipal and state government, understandings that they often do not share with 
single-office holders. The ban, a chunk of political capital waiting to be cashed in 
that the government had been keeping for a rainy day, became and easily 
accessible way to check the power of multiple-office holders, who were more 
likely than single-office holders to have supported McGreevey. 
  The grandfather clause had a bit more to do with the geographic 
fragmentation of multiple-office holders than any particular point in time. The 
clause was the most precise way the multiple-office holders could deal with the 
issue and keep their jobs without losing favorability among their constituents, 
especially in places where they were most abundant, i,e, Hudson, Bergen, and 
Essex counties. As one of the biggest groups of multiple-office holders ever 
assembled in the legislature, they wielded significant influence—enough to make 
sure a complete ban did not pass. On the one hand, making sure the ban did not 
pass would give individual legislators a negative image among their constituency.   109 
This is the reason why individuals like Brian Stack et al abstained from the vote. 
On the other, being part of the movement to ban multiple-office holding would 
cost them at least one of their jobs, and the fact that Corzine was backing the 
effort made it particularly insidious for Democrats to oppose it, just as Tom 
Kean’s influence tainted Republicans against the effort. The compromise was to 
get one of their own involved in the drafting of the bill—namely, Newark Mayor 
Sharpe James in the State Senate—and at the very least secure their own jobs. 
Thus both sides have arrived at a precarious compromise that almost everyone 
agrees is mutually detrimental. For those that oppose multiple-office holding, the 
grandfather clause guarantees it for at least another 30-40 years. For those that 
support it, it prevents up-and-coming leaders from gaining a second office and 
joining the veterans. 
  Explaining trends over time and place presents to us a much more difficult 
puzzle than the reasoning behind any singular event in state history, and as such 
organizing the trends of multiple-office holding across the state over time can be 
much more daunting than explaining why the ban occurred when it did. Before 
this study, to my knowledge no one had compiled a database of multiple-office 
holders over time in the state (the database used here was collected from 
biographical sketches and newspaper articles). Thus the biggest hurdle in studying 
the history of multiple-office holding in New Jersey was the lack of interest by 
other scholars that would lead to compiling data in useful ways before the study. 
After organizing the data in an easily digestible manner, it became apparent that 
there was indeed a pattern developed over the recent history of the state: urban   110 
areas with high population density and often high concentrations of immigrant 
populations were more favorable to multiple-office holding than places that did 
not experience this. In contrast, upper class, ethnically homogenous, and scarcely 
populated communities have adopted, for the most part, a completely different 
and less engaged political culture where the incentives to hold more than one 
office are lacking. 
  With this batch of information, it becomes much simpler to achieve the 
goal of coming to some concrete conclusions on the matter. For one, it is safe to 
say that multiple-office holding is a New Jersey tradition and part of the New 
Jerseyan urban counter-culture to which we can also attribute large amounts of 
political shadiness and corruption, as well as a healthy dose of Latin American-
style populism. Banning the practice was the final blow to a previous 
administration lead by multiple-office holder that epitomized the aura of one of 
his own, even if Woodbridge is not exactly a Newark of sorts. Yet unlike the 
conclusions found within other major works discussing multiple-office holding, 
or, rather, one of if not the only major work on multiple-office holding in New 
Jersey, Tom O’Neill’s One to a Customer: The Democratic Downsides of Dual-
Office Holding, the goal of this work was to open a window into a world few in 
the political realm seem to have been able to identify. It is purely intended to be 
explanatory, not prescriptive. There was never a persuasive intent in this piece 
one way or the other, and that is because I did not feel properly equipped to form 
an opinion one way or the other before concluding my study and establishing the 
value of some facts of the matter over others. Now, at the conclusion of this piece,   111 
I feel at liberty to take on the eight objections to multiple-office holding that 
O’Neill presents in his study (as this is not the focus of this study at all, I would 
like to conclude with a casual evaluation of these objections based on previous 
observation). 
O’Neill’s Eight Objections to Multiple-Office Holding 
  In the executive summary of his study, O’Neill highlights eight basic 
objections to multiple-office holding which he expands upon in the body of the 
work. As he states them, dual-office holding: 
• Insulates office holders from political accountability 
• Frustrates the system of checks and balances among levels of government 
• Is a form of political double-dipping 
• Amplifies pork-barrel spending 
• Blocks the political ladder to emerging aspirants 
• Reinforces the state’s predilection for localism,parochialism and fragmentation 
• Creates “low-show”jobs that divide the time and attention of elected officials 
• Puts officials in a built-in conflict situation (O’Neill 6) 
I will cede that not every single point O’Neill makes against multiple-office 
holding is completely invalid, yet, taking each one into consideration, it becomes 
clearer based on evidence from this study that many of these are severely 
overblown. Take, for example, the first point: holding more than one office limits 
political accountability. From discussions with Mayor Connors and Senator Sacco 
et al, it appears that in practice the opposite is true. Having more than one office 
bestows upon the politician more responsibilities: that of both his jobs. Having 
both of these responsibilities means that the public servant is more accountable to 
more people that depend on him. The also works in theory; if a public servant has 
two jobs, he also has two constituencies that often overlap. Not only, then, does 
this public servant have two sets of people depending on him for political aid, but 
as the groups overlap there is a substantial portion of the population that voted   112 
him in that depend on the leader for more than one set of political needs. There is 
no clear way in which having more responsibility could possibly create less 
accountability. What’s more, the politician is now responsible for maintaining 
more than one job, meaning the leader must win twice the number of elections he 
previously needed to. None of these factors create less accountability. 
  The argument that multiple-office holding frustrates the checks and 
balances system within the government has some weight to it, at least more than 
the previous point. If the legislative and executive branches are one in the same, 
then how is it possible for one to check the other? However, this takes very little 
sleep from me at night for one main reason: most multiple-office holders (with the 
very rare exception when the President of the State Senate becomes the Governor) 
hold positions within the same levels of different branches. That is to say, rarely 
do the people that write the laws for cities become mayors, and rarely if ever do 
state legislators become governors. Because the offices are separated vertically by 
their respective levels of government, the jobs are not playing the same game of 
checks and balances with each other. That is to say, they are apples and oranges to 
each other. O’Neill’s third point is redundant and meaningless, and his fourth is 
only objectionable if one does not recognize the spin inherent in using the phrase 
“pork-barrel spending”. “Double-dipping” and multiple-office holding are 
synonymous (his second argument is much like saying that running a town is a 
form of governing). Moreover, there are many positive initiatives that go through 
the legislative process because there is a member of the legislature present that 
understands more thoroughly the way in which bills affect towns. This is a point   113 
Mayor Connors emphasized during our interview and one which is verified by the 
improvements in Union City visible after its mayor became state senator, such as 
several new parks and a brand new high school. In a city where the  two current 
high schools were so overpopulated that many teachers had classrooms of 30+ 
children, it is difficult to reduce a new educational facility to mere “pork-barrel 
spending”. 
  It is near impossible to argue that having fewer individuals employed in 
more jobs makes it more difficult for other individuals to rise and take over, so 
this point I will not argue (again, I do not pretend to point out that every downside 
to multiple-office holding is false). Nor will I argue against the fact that multiple-
office holding instills in a state that is already culturally fragmented an increased 
awareness in the political and cultural differences that exist among regions. On 
this point, however, I will argue that O’Neill is wrong in fearing this result. Here 
he may be following Paul Peterson’s line of thought that cities and towns are 
extremely dependent on higher levels of power, thus rendering any study of the 
town as a city-state somewhat obsolete. However, it is just as dangerous to 
attempt to govern places with measurably different political cultures in the same 
way, both on a micro and macro scale. Attempting to “bring” democracy to Iraq is 
just as much of a failure as removing, say, the Board of Chosen Freeholders from 
every city in New Jersey and replacing it with other types of county governments 
found elsewhere. On many occasions, from Surf City to North Bergen, multiple-
office holding has been a success story. That it cannot be so in places like Cape   114 
May that are vastly different in its needs and requirements does not make it a 
complete failure.  
  O’Neill’s last two arguments, that dual-office holding creates “low-show” 
jobs and creates natural conflicts of interest contradict each other somewhat. The 
assumption in the “low-show” argument is that the dual-office holder will only 
take one of his responsibilities seriously, thus making the other one (usually the 
one that the dual-office holder needs to commute to) a “low-show” job. It 
generates apathy towards at least one of the jobs, the argument goes. Yet, if the 
multiple-office holder inherently begins not to care about one of the jobs, how 
would this create a conflict of interest? It would, surely, create a power vacuum 
where someone should be executing a task and is too busy with the other job, but 
for a conflict of interest to arise, if such a thing exists, the dual-office holder 
needs to be fully committed to both jobs such that he or she is conflicted about 
what decision to make. Otherwise every decision would have the interests of the 
one job the politician cares about in mind. What’s more, to resurrect another 
argument from Chapter 5, there is no reason for there to be conflicts of interest, 
since many constituencies overlap such that their interests overlap as well, and 
even when they do not it is highly uncommon for two constituencies to have 
diametrically opposed interests. Moreover, there are many practices that are legal 
and present even greater conflicts of interest, such as practicing lawyers working 
as legislators. Many legislators have clients with which they work who would 
benefit from specific pieces of legislation. This inherently tarnishes the 
legislator’s voting integrity yet violates no laws.   115 
  The verdict in the court of public opinion is still out on multiple-office 
holding, and certainly there is plenty of time left for the current double-dippers to 
reverse the current law. Just as there are a number of negative repercussions to 
having one person hold several major responsibilities in a government, however, 
it is important to take into consideration the other side. The future of multiple-
office holding, despite its recent ban, is extremely open-ended, as it appears that 
neither the benefits outweigh the costs nor vice-versa on general terms, though in 
the urban areas that prefer the practice there does seem to be some greater benefit 
to its establishment. Perhaps a future political coup similar to the one that ousted 
McGreevey will remove Corzine and put a multiple-office holder in his place. Or 
perhaps it will take enough time for the extinction of multiple-office holders to 
become clearer for the legislature to come to the conclusion that the practice was 
not all that bad, after all. Either way, one thing is for certain: all of this could only 
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Appendix A 
Index of Interviewees 
Silvio Acosta- Human rights activist against the torture of Cuban political 
prisoners for 20+ years in West New York, NJ. Director of local 
newsletter The Political Reporter and active supporter of Brian P. Stack 
for State Senate....................................................................................77, 79 
Anonymous Brian Stack Supporter.....................................................................4 
Leonard Connors- Mayor of Surf City, NJ since 1966 and dual-office holder 
(State Senator for District 9) from 1982-2008......................................85-87 
Manuel Hernandez- Union City resident attending Brian Stack “Bringing the 
Government to the People” Event................................................................5 
Bob Ingle- Trenton Bureau chief of Gannett newspapers and author of The 
Soprano State..................................................................................44, 59-60 
Nicholas Sacco- Mayor of North Bergen, NJ and State Senator for District 32 
since 1991 and North Bergen Superintendent of Schools since 
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Figure 2.3: Multiple-Office Holding 1988-2008 by Party.................................41 
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2008........................................................................................................................66 
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Appendix C 
List of Multiple-Office Holders in NJ Legislature in the Past 
20 Years  
 
Red- Republican                        Blue- Democratic 
 
Year  Name  Chamber  County  District 
2008  Stephen Sweeney  S  Cumberland  3 
2008  Ronald Rice  S  Essex  28 
2008  Paul Sarlo  A  Bergen  36 
2008  Paul Moriarty  A  Camden  4 
2008  Nicholas Sacco  S  Hudson  32 
2008  Joseph Egan  A  Somerset  17 
2008  John Burzichelli  A  Salem  3 
2008  Gary Schaer  A  Passaic  36 
2008  Dana Redd  S  Camden  5 
2008  Brian Stack  S  Hudson  33 
2008  Scott Rudder  A  Burlington  38 
2008  Ronald Dancer  A  Ocean  30 
2008  Daniel Van Pelt  A  Ocean  9 
2008  Brian Rumpf  A  Ocean  9 
2007  Valerie Vainieri Huttle  A  Bergen  37 
2007  Uprenda Chivukula  A  Somerset  17 
2007  Stephen Sweeney  S  Cumberland  3 
2007  Silverio Vega  A  Hudson  33 
2007  Ronald Rice  S  Essex  28 
2007  Paul Sarlo  A  Bergen  36 
2007  Paul Moriarty  A  Camden  4 
2007  Nicholas Sacco  S  Hudson  32 
2007  Mims Hackett  A  Essex  27 
2007  Joseph Egan  A  Somerset  17 
2007  Joseph Doria  S  Hudson  31 
2007  John McKeon  A  Essex  27 
2007  John Burzichelli  A  Salem  3 
2007  Gary Schaer  A  Passaic  36 
2007  Brian Stack  A  Hudson  33 
2007  Ronald Dancer  A  Ocean  30 
2007  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
2007  Marcia Karrow  A  Hunterdon  23 
2007  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
2007  John Rooney  A  Bergen  39 
2007  James McCullough  S  Atlantic  2 
2007  Brian Rumpf  A  Ocean  9 
2006  Valerie Vainieri Huttle  A  Bergen  37 
2006  Uprenda Chivukula  A  Somerset  17   132 
2006  Stephen Sweeney  S  Gloucester  3 
2006  Sharpe James  S  Union  29 
2006  Ronald Rice  S  Essex  28 
2006  Paul Sarlo  A  Bergen  36 
2006  Paul Moriarty  A  Camden  4 
2006  Pamela Lampitt  A  Camden  6 
2006  Nicholas Sacco  S  Hudson  32 
2006  Mims Hackett  A  Essex  27 
2006  Joseph Egan  A  Somerset  17 
2006  Joseph Doria  S  Hudson  31 
2006  John McKeon  A  Essex  27 
2006  John Burzichelli  A  Salem  3 
2006  Joan Voss  A  Bergen  38 
2006  Gary Schaer  A  Passaic  36 
2006  Brian Stack  A  Hudson  33 
2006  Albio Sires  A  Hudson  33 
2006  Ronald Dancer  A  Ocean  30 
2006  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
2006  Marcia Karrow  A  Hunterdon  23 
2006  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
2006  Jennifer Beck  A  Monmouth  12 
2006  Brian Rumpf  A  Ocean  9 
2005  Uprenda Chivukula  A  Somerset  17 
2005  Stephen Sweeney  S  Gloucester  3 
2005  Sharpe James  S  Union  29 
2005  Ronald Rice  S  Essex  28 
2005  Peter Eagler  A  Passaic  34 
2005  Paul Sarlo  A  Bergen  36 
2005  Nicholas Sacco  S  Hudson  32 
2005  Mims Hackett  A  Essex  27 
2005  Joseph Egan  A  Somerset  17 
2005  Joseph Doria  S  Hudson  31 
2005  John McKeon  A  Essex  27 
2005  John Burzichelli  A  Salem  3 
2005  Joan Voss  A  Bergen  38 
2005  Donald Tucker  A  Essex  29 
2005  Brian Stack  A  Hudson  33 
2005  Anthony Chiappone  A  Hudson  31 
2005  Alfred Steele  A  Passaic  35 
2005  Albio Sires  A  Hudson  33 
2005  Ronald Dancer  A  Ocean  30 
2005  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
2005  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
2005  Brian Rumpf  A  Ocean  9 
2004  Uprenda Chivukula  A  Somerset  17 
2004  Stephen Sweeney  S  Gloucester  3 
2004  Sharpe James  S  Union  29   133 
2004  Ronald Rice  S  Essex  28 
2004  Peter Eagler  A  Passaic  34 
2004  Paul Sarlo  S  Bergen  36 
2004  Nicholas Sacco  S  Hudson  32 
2004  Mims Hackett  A  Essex  27 
2004  Joseph Egan  A  Somerset  17 
2004  John McKeon  A  Essex  27 
2004  John Burzichelli  A  Salem  3 
2004  Glenn Cunningham  S  Hudson  31 
2004  Donald Tucker  A  Essex  29 
2004  Brian Stack  A  Hudson  33 
2004  Anthony Chiappone  A  Hudson  31 
2004  Albio Sires  A  Hudson  33 
2004  Ronald Dancer  A  Ocean  30 
2004  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
2004  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
2004  Brian Rumpf  A  Ocean  9 
2003  Uprenda Chivukula  A  Somerset  17 
2003  Stephen Sweeney  S  Gloucester  3 
2003  Sharpe James  S  Union  29 
2003  Ronald Rice  S  Essex  28 
2003  Peter Eagler  A  Passaic  34 
2003  Paul Sarlo  A  Bergen  36 
2003  Nicholas Sacco  S  Hudson  32 
2003  Mims Hackett  A  Essex  27 
2003  Joseph Suliga  A  Bergen  20 
2003  Joseph Egan  A  Somerset  17 
2003  Joseph Doria  A  Hudson  31 
2003  John McKeon  A  Essex  27 
2003  John Burzichelli  A  Salem  3 
2003  Garry Furnari  S  Essex  36 
2003  Donald Tucker  A  Essex  29 
2003  Alfred Steele  A  Passaic  35 
2003  Albio Sires  A  Hudson  33 
2003  Ronald Dancer  A  Ocean  30 
2003  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
2003  Paul D'Amato  A  Atlantic  2 
2003  Michael Doherty  A  Warren  23 
2003  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
2003  Joseph Pennacchio  A  Bergen  26 
2002  Uprenda Chivukula  A  Somerset  17 
2002  Stephen Sweeney  S  Gloucester  3 
2002  Sharpe James  S  Union  29 
2002  Rafael Fraguela  A  Hudson  33 
2002  Peter Eagler  A  Passaic  34 
2002  Paul Sarlo  A  Bergen  36 
2002  Nicholas Sacco  S  Hudson  32   134 
2002  Mims Hackett  A  Essex  27 
2002  Joseph Suliga  A  Bergen  20 
2002  Joseph Egan  A  Somerset  17 
2002  Joseph Doria  A  Hudson  31 
2002  John McKeon  A  Essex  27 
2002  John Burzichelli  A  Salem  3 
2002  Gordon Johnson  A  Bergen  37 
2002  Garry Furnari  S  Essex  36 
2002  Donald Tucker  A  Essex  29 
2002  Alfred Steele  A  Passaic  35 
2002  Albio Sires  A  Hudson  33 
2002  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
2002  Paul D'Amato  A  Atlantic  2 
2002  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
2002  Joseph Pennacchio  A  Bergen  26 
2002  John Rooney  A  Bergen  39 
2001  Sharpe James  S  Union  29 
2001  Nicholas Sacco  S  Hudson  32 
2001  Joseph Suliga  A  Bergen  20 
2001  Joseph Doria  A  Hudson  31 
2001  Garry Furnari  S  Essex  36 
2001  Donald Tucker  A  Essex  29 
2001  Charles Zisa  A  Bergen  37 
2001  Alfred Steele  A  Passaic  35 
2001  Albio Sires  A  Hudson  33 
2001  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
2001  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
2001  Joseph Pennacchio  A  Bergen  26 
2001  John Rooney  A  Bergen  39 
2001  Jack Sinagra  S  Middlesex  18 
2000  Sharpe James  S  Union  29 
2000  Raul Garcia  A  Hudson  33 
2000  Nicholas Sacco  S  Hudson  32 
2000  Joseph Suliga  A  Bergen  20 
2000  Joseph Doria  A  Hudson  31 
2000  Garry Furnari  S  Essex  36 
2000  Donald Tucker  A  Essex  29 
2000  Charles Zisa  A  Bergen  37 
2000  Alfred Steele  A  Passaic  35 
2000  Albio Sires  A  Hudson  33 
2000  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
2000  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
2000  Larry Chatzidakis  A  Burlington  8 
2000  John Rooney  A  Bergen  39 
2000  Jack Sinagra  S  Middlesex  18 
1999  Raul Garcia  A  Hudson  33 
1999  Nicholas Sacco  S  Hudson  32   135 
1999  Joseph Suliga  A  Bergen  20 
1999  Joseph Doria  A  Hudson  31 
1999  Garry Furnari  S  Essex  36 
1999  Donald Tucker  A  Essex  29 
1999  Charles Zisa  A  Bergen  37 
1999  Alfred Steele  A  Passaic  35 
1999  Paul Kramer  A  Mercer  14 
1999  Melvin Cottrell  A  Burlington  30 
1999  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
1999  Larry Chatzidakis  A  Burlington  8 
1999  John Rooney  A  Bergen  39 
1999  Gerald J. Luongo  A  Camden  4 
1998  Raul Garcia  A  Hudson  33 
1998  Nicholas Sacco  S  Hudson  32 
1998  Joseph Suliga  A  Bergen  20 
1998  Joseph Doria  A  Hudson  31 
1998  Garry Furnari  S  Essex  36 
1998  Donald Tucker  A  Union  29 
1998  Charles Zisa  A  Bergen  37 
1998  Alfred Steele  A  Passaic  35 
1998  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
1998  Paul Kramer  A  Mercer  14 
1998  Norman Robert  S  Passaic  34 
1998  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
1998  Larry Chatzidakis  A  Burlington?  8 
1998  John Rooney  A  Bergen  39 
1998  Jeffrey Moran  A  Ocean  9 
1998  Gerald J. Luongo  A  Camden  4 
1997  Willie Brown  A  Union  29 
1997  Ronald Rice  S  Essex  28 
1997  Nicholas Sacco  S  Hudson  32 
1997  Joseph Suliga  A  Bergen  20 
1997  James McGreevey  S  Middlesex  19 
1997  Jackie Mattison  A  Union  29 
1997  Alfred Steele  A  Passaic  35 
1997  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
1997  Paul Kramer  A  Mercer  14 
1997  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
1997  Larry Chatzidakis  A  Burlington?  8 
1997  Joseph Malone  A  Burlington  30 
1997  John Rooney  A  Bergen  39 
1997  Jeffrey Moran  A  Ocean  9 
1997  Jack Sinagra  S  Middlesex  18 
1997  Carmine DeSopo  A  Burlington  7 
1996  William Pascrell  A  Passaic  35 
1996  Nicholas Sacco  A  Hudson  32 
1996  Joseph Suliga  A  Bergen  20   136 
1996  James McGreevey  S  Middlesex  19 
1996  Alfred Steele  A  Passaic  35 
1996  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
1996  Paul DiGaetano  A  Passaic  36 
1996  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
1996  Kenneth LeFevre  A  Atlantic  2 
1996  Joseph Malone  A  Burlington  30 
1996  John Rooney  A  Bergen  39 
1996  Jack Sinagra  S  Middlesex  18 
1996  Christopher Bateman  A  Somerset  16 
1995  William Pascrell  A  Passaic  35 
1995  Steven Petrillo  A  Burlington  7 
1995  Nicholas Sacco  A  Hudson  32 
1995  Joseph Suliga  A  Bergen  20 
1995  James McGreevey  S  Middlesex  19 
1995  Alfred Steele  A  Passaic  35 
1995  Rose Marie Heck  A  Bergen  38 
1995  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
1995  Paul Kramer  A  Mercer  14 
1995  Paul DiGaetano  A  Passaic  36 
1995  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
1995  Lee Solomon  A  Camden  6 
1995  Joseph Malone  A  Burlington  30 
1995  John Rooney  A  Bergen  39 
1994  William Pascrell  A  Passaic  35 
1994  Thomas Foley  A  Mercer  2 
1994  Ronald Rice  S  Essex  28 
1994  Nicholas Sacco  S  Hudson  32 
1994  Joseph Yuhas  A  Mercer  15 
1994  Joseph Doria  A  Hudson  31 
1994  James McGreevey  S  Middlesex  19 
1994  Jackie Mattison  A  Union  29 
1994  Rose Marie Heck  A  Bergen  38 
1994  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
1994  Paul DiGaetano  A  Passaic  36 
1994  Melvin Cottrell  A  Burlington  30 
1994  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
1994  Joseph Malone  A  Burlington  30 
1994  John Rooney  A  Bergen  39 
1994  Jack Sinagra  S  Middlesex  18 
1994  Christopher Bateman  A  Somerset  16 
1993  William Pascrell  A  Passaic  35 
1993  Steven Petrillo  A  Burlington  7 
1993  Ronald Rice  S  Essex  28 
1993  Nicholas Sacco  S  Hudson  32 
1993  Joseph Doria  A  Hudson  31 
1993  James McGreevey  S  Middlesex  19   137 
1993  Jackie Mattison  A  Union  29 
1993  Rose Marie Heck  A  Bergen  38 
1993  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
1993  Paul DiGaetano  A  Passaic  36 
1993  Melvin Cottrell  A  Burlington  30 
1993  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
1993  Lee Solomon  A  Camden  6 
1993  Joseph Malone  A  Burlington  30 
1993  John Rooney  A  Bergen  39 
1993  John Rooney  A  Bergen  39 
1993  Jack Sinagra  S  Middlesex  18 
1992  William Pascrell  A  Passaic  35 
1992  Ronald Rice  S  Essex  28 
1992  Robert Menendez  S  Hudson  33 
1992  Richard Bagger  A  Union  22 
1992  Jackie Mattison  A  Union  29 
1992  Anthony Impreveduto  A  Hudson  32 
1992  Stephen Mikulak  A  Middlesex  19 
1992  Rose Marie Heck  A  Bergen  38 
1992  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
1992  Paul DiGaetano  A  Passaic  36 
1992  Melvin Cottrell  A  Burlington  30 
1992  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
1992  John Rooney  A  Bergen  39 
1992  Fredrick Nickles  A  Atlantic  2 
1992  Bradford Smith  S  Burlington  7 
1991  Ronald Rice  S  Essex  28 
1991  Robert Menendez  A  Hudson  33 
1991  Louis Gill  A  Passaic  39 
1991  Jackie Mattison  A  Union  29 
1991  Anthony Impreveduto  A  Hudson  32 
1991  Ann Mullen  A  Camden  4 
1991  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
1991  Paul DiGaetano  A  Passaic  36 
1991  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
1991  John Rooney  A  Bergen  39 
1991  John Gaffney  A  Atlantic  2 
1991  Clare Farragher  A  Monmouth  12 
1990  Ronald Rice  S  Essex  28 
1990  Robert Menendez  S  Hudson  33 
1990  Louis Gill  A  Passaic  39 
1990  Jackie Mattison  A  Union  29 
1990  George Otlowski  A  Middlesex  19 
1990  George Hudak  A  Middlesex  20 
1990  Carmen Orechio  S  Essex  30 
1990  Anthony Marsella  A  Camden  4 
1990  Anthony Impreveduto  A  Hudson  32 
1990  Ann Mullen  A  Gloucester  4 
1990  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
1990  Paul DiGaetano  A  Passaic  36   138 
1989  Louis Gill  A  Passaic  39 
1989  Jackie Mattison  A  Union  29 
1989  George Spadoro  A  Middlesex  18 
1989  George Otlowski  A  Middlesex  19 
1989  George Hudak  A  Middlesex  20 
1989  Frank Graves  S  Passaic  34 
1989  Carmen Orechio  S  Essex  30 
1989  Anthony Marsella  A  Camden  4 
1989  Anthony Impreveduto  A  Hudson  32 
1989  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
1989  Paul DiGaetano  A  Passaic  36 
1989  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
1989  John Hendrickson  A  Ocean  9 
1989  J. Edward Kline  A  Atlantic  2 
1988  Ronald Rice  S  Essex  28 
1988  Robert Menendez  S  Hudson  33 
1988  Louis Gill  A  Passaic  39 
1988  John Lynch  S  Middlesex  17 
1988  Jackie Mattison  A  Union  29 
1988  George Spadoro  A  Middlesex  18 
1988  George Otlowski  A  Middlesex  19 
1988  George Hudak  A  Middlesex  20 
1988  Frank Pallone  S  Monmouth  11 
1988  Frank Graves  S  Passaic  34 
1988  Carmen Orechio  S  Essex  30 
1988  Anthony Marsella  A  Camden  4 
1988  Anthony Impreveduto  A  Hudson  32 
1988  Robert Singer  S  Monmouth  30 
1988  Paul DiGaetano  A  Passaic  36 
1988  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 







1990  Leonard Connors  S  Atlantic  9 
1989  Ronald Rice  S  Essex  28 
1989  Robert Menendez  S  Hudson  33   139 
Appendix D 
Assorted Photographs 
Surf City, NJ 
 
An abandoned shack on the Surf City end of the Route 72 Bridge connecting mainland 
New Jersey to Long Beach Island, of which Surf City is one division. Photo August 2008, 
Frances Martel. 
Left: State Senator Leonard Connors Jr. in his office in Surf City. Right: LBI's houses 
reach well into the multi-million-dollar range. Photo June 2006, Reuben Cox (New York 
Magazine). 
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Union City, NJ 
 
From Left: Union City Commissioner Tilo Rivas, Union City Mayor Brian Stack, West 
New York Commissioner Sal Vega, and Senator Robert Menendez walk in the 2005 
Hudson County Cuban Day Parade. Vega and Stack would later run against each other 
for State Senate. Photo May 2005, Anonymous (Courtesy Emilio Del Valle) 
 
Dominican Supporters of Union City Mayor Brian Stack demonstrate their solidarity with 
his campaign for State Senate in the 2007 Hispanic Day Parade in Hudson County. Photo 
June 2007, Frances Martel   141 
West New York, NJ 
 
The “Sal Vega Freedom Wagon” Drives Across Palisade Ave. in West New York, NJ 
during the 2007 State Senate Campaign. Photo c. May 2007, Unknown Photographer 
(Courtesy Silvio Acosta). 
 
West New York Mayor Sal Vega poses with volunteers cleaning up a park by the Hudson 
River as part of the city’s “Pride Campaign”. Photo c. 2008, Unknown Photographer 
(Courtesy Silvio Acosta)   142 
 
Brian P. Stack, then a civilian, walking Bergenline Avenue with a group of volunteers on 
his cleaning Union City tour. Photo c. 1999, Rafael Martel  
 
José R. Martel, a local Cuban octogenarian, waves a flag at the 2008 Cuban Day Parade 
as the 95.7 FM Radio wagon drives by. Photo June 2008, Frances Martel 
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A poster on 45
th Street and Bergenline Ave. in Union City in support of Brian Stack for 
state senate. The poster still currently stands over the busy market street. Photo June 
2008, Frances Martel 
 
Brian Stack reacts to first news of his victory against Sal Vega in the 2007 state senate 
elections while volunteer John Medina cheers him on at a Union City voting station. 
Photo June 5, 2007, Frances Martel 